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THE NEW YORK STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT:
SOME REFLECTIONS UPON ITS STRUCTURE AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
by DANIEL J. GIFFORD*
T he New York State Administrative Procedure Act1 is a fascinat-
ing hybrid containing elements of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act2 and of the two versions of the Model State Admin-
istrative Procedure Act promulgated by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.8 It is also a blend, perhaps successful, of two
competing influences. A pressure to adopt a general administrative
procedure act applicable to all or most state agencies had been
generated by the example and apparent success of the Federal Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, by the promulgation of the two ver-
sions of the Model Act, and by the enactment of general acts in a
rapidly growing number of states.4 Resisting this pressure was a
tradition of cautious reluctance to adopt such an act, a reluctance
originally expressed in 1942 by Commissioner Robert Benjamin
in his Report on Administrative Adjudication in New York.5
This Article examines several of the more important provi-
sions of the New York Act, both substantively and in their
historical context. Noting Benjamin's objections to a general
administrative procedure act6 it surveys the events of the decade
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo, Faculty of Law and
Jurisprudence; 1977-78, Visiting Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School;
A. B., Holy Cross College, 1953; LL. B., Harvard University, 1958.
1. N.Y. STATE AD. PRoc. Aar (McKinney 1976).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1970).
3. MODEL STATE ADmINISaATION PROcEDuRE Aca (1946) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
AcT]; R vissw MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURE Acr (1961) [hereinafter cited as
REVISED MODEL AC]. In the textual discussion that follows, the 1946 version of the Model
State Administrative Procedure Act will be referred to as the "original Model Act" and the
1961 version will be referred to as the "Revised Model Act."
4. Recent collections of state administrative procedure acts can be found, inter alia,
in W. GELLHORN . C. BYSE. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES & COMMENTS 1160-62 (6th ed.
1974); Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act: Background, Construction, Ap-
plicability, Public Access to Agency Law, the Rulemaking Process, 60 IowA L. Rxv. 731,
745-47 (1975).
5. 1 R. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATION AJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 9-17
(1942).
6. See text accompanying note: 114-17 infra.
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preceding enactment, first because these events are of interest in
their own right, and more importantly, because part of that
history is relevant to an appreciation of the final form of the
New York Act.7 The basic structure and several major provisions
of the New York Act is then analyzed in the light of New York's
modifications of the provisions that it has incorporated from these
other acts. Finally, the significance of the New York Act is assessed
in the light of developments in state administrative law.
The conclusion that emerges from this examination is that
the New York Act-in the form in which it emerged from the
legislature and in which it was signed into law by the Governor-
is a major dissent from the trend towards excessive judicialization 8
in state administrative procedure legislation, a trend that began
with the promulgation of the Revised Model Act in 1961.1
Moreover, the New York Act may point the way towards a new
course of development in state administrative procedure, a course
which the New York Act itself does not take but which its internal
dynamics suggest.' 0
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Thirty-four years ago Commissioner Robert Benjamin sub-
mitted an exhaustive study of state administrative law to then
Governor Lehman. The study recommended against New York's
adoption of a general administrative procedure act," a recommen-
dation that was respected until 1962, when the legislature, by
concurrent resolution, 2 directed the New York Law Revision
Commission to study the advisability of providing general stan-
dards for administrative agency hearing procedures and rulemak-
ing and of adopting new legislation governing judicial review of
administrative action. In 1963 the Commission submitted a prelimi-
nary report 3 to the legislature outlining the complexity of the task
7. As the discussion will show, the final form of the New York State Administrative
Procedure Act is largely a result of influences generated by the New York Law Revision
Commission and the State Public Service Commission. See text accompanying notes 11-82
infra.
8. "Judicialization," as that term is employed in this article, refers to modeling agency
procedure on trial procedure.
9. See note 3 supra.
10. See text accompanying notes 83-113 infra.
11. See 1 R. BENJAMIN, supra, note 5, at 24-36.
12. S. Res. No. 103 (1962).
13. N.Y. LAw REVIsION CoMAIISSION, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO TIlE LEI.GISIATURE RELAT-
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it had been assigned. The legislature responded by concurrent
resolution 14 directing the Commission to narrow its focus to the
question of judicial review and to the rulemaking procedures of
state-as distinguished from local-agencies.
Although the Commission then limited itself to state agencies,
it did not confine itself to rulemaking and judicial review. In 1965,
it submitted three proposals to the legislature with accompanying
research reports.15 These proposals were contained in: (1) a draft
administrative procedure act; (2) a draft rulemaking procedure act,
which was an alternative to the draft administrative procedure act;
and (3) draft legislation establishing a Division of Administrative
Procedure in the Executive Department which would thereafter
be concerned with improving administrative procedures. These
proposals, with minor modifications, were resubmitted by the Com-
mission in 1966.18 In 1969, the Commission resubmitted a pro-
posed administrative procedure act and legislation establishing
a Division of State Administrative Procedure.
The major problematic aspect of the administrative proce-
dure act bills drafted by the Law Revision Commission was the
manner in which the acts would have treated ratemaking and
similar types of economic regulatory decisionmaking. It appears
that substantial objection to the Commission's proposals lay on
the grounds that the bills would have imposed an overly judicial-
ized decisional format upon ratemaking and similar types of
economic regulatory decisionmaking. This objection is, of course,
also an objection to the Revised Model Act which imposes the
same stringent prohibitions upon contact between agency and
ING TO STUDY OF ADVISABILITY OF LEGISLATION PROVIDING GENERAL STANDARDS FOR HEARING
PROCEDURES AND RULE MAKING OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND PROVIDING FOR JUDICIAL
R viIEW LGIS. Doc. No. 65(A), 186th Sess. (1963).
14. S. Res. No. 9 (1964).
15. N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO AN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Aar, AN ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING PROCEDURE ACT, AND A
DIVISION OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LAW 19, LEGIS. Doc. No. 65 (A), 188th Sess.
(1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 N.Y. LAwI REVISION COMMISSION REPORT].
16. N.Y. LAw REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO AN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Aar, AN ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING ACT, AND A DIVISION OF
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LAW 23, LEGIS. Doc. No. 65 (A), 189th Sess. (1966) [here-
inafter cited as 1966 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORT].
17. N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDY RELATING
TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND A DIVISION OF STATE ADMINISTRAIVE PROCEDURE
LAw 21, LEGIS. DoC. No. (65A), 192d Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 N.Y. LAW RE-
VISION COMMISSION REPORT].
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staff in ratemaking proceedings as it does in other adjudicatory
procedings.18 It is an objection, however, that the Law Revision
Commission had attempted to forestall by incorporating certain
modifications into provisions it had taken from the Revised Model
Act. 9
That the Law Revision Commission's proposals were seen
as imposing overly judicialized procedures upon ratemaking and
some other types of administrative regulatory functioning is evi-
denced by the course of events during the few years following the
Commission's submission of those proposals in 1969. No action
was taken on the Commission's bills during the 1969 legislative
session. In 1970, the bills were reintroduced, but their sponsors
also introduced revisions of those bills which indicated a new
sensitivity to the way the proposed State Administrative Pro-
cedure Act would affect ratemaking and certain other economic
regulatory decisionmaking.20
These revised bills borrowed a technique from the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act. They recast and enlarged the Law
Revision Commission's definition of "rule" so that it embraced
ratemaking and other economic regulatory matters. In the federal
act "rule" is defined to include ratemaking in order to remove
ratemaking proceedings from the full complex of procedures
applicable to adjudication.21 The expanded definition of "rule"
in the 1970 revisions of the Law Revision Commission's bills
18. See the critique of the Revised Model Act in K. DAVS, ADMINISMrATivE LAW
TREATISE § 1.04-6 (Supp. 1970). See also Bloomenthal, The Revised Model State Adminis-
trative Procedure Act-Reform or Retrogression? 1963 DuKE L. J. 593, 601, 613-20; Dakin,
The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act-Critique and Commentary, 25
LA. L. REv. 799, 813 (1965); Gifford, Report on Administrative Law to the Tennessee
Law Revision Commission, 20 VAND. L. Ray. 777, 865 (1967).
19. See text accompanying notes 159-174 infra.
20. In the 1970 legislative session, A. 8930 and S. 7141 embodied the Law Revision
Commission proposals of the preceding year. Indeed, those bills bore a note at the end
indicating that they were recommended by the Law Revision Commission and citing the
Law Revision Commission's 1969 and 1966 reports. The same sponsors also introduced
A. 3930-A, A. 3930-B, S. 7141-A and S. 7141-B. These latter bills also bore the note
indicating recommendation by the Law Revision Commission. They incorporated lan-
guage from the Federal Administrative Procedure Act defining ratemaking for the future
and other future-oriented economic regulatory proceedings as rulemaking. The redefini-
tion of "rule" in the substitute bills of the 1970 session, however, did not incorporate
the federal act's reference to matters of particular as well as general applicability.
21. The federal act essentially divides administrative proceedings into so-called
informal rulemaking, adjudications, and formal rulemaking. Informal rulemaking involves
[Vol. 26
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would similarly have prevented the ratemaking covered by the
"rule" definition from being subjected to the bills' adjudicatory
procedures. Yet it was unclear whether the revised "rule" defini-
tion embraced only general ratemaking, or whether it also em-
notice-and-comment procedure. 15 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). Adjudication for which oppor-
tunity for hearing is required by statute involves evidentiary-hearing procedures. Pre-
siding officers, who must be selected according to specific rules, are given certain pro-
cedural powers. 5 U.S.C. § 556. The statute also provides for rules of evidence, official
notice, and exclusiveness of the record, id., and establishes procedures for preliminary
decisions and for internal review of those decisions, id. § 557. Furthermore, administra-
tive personnel who are involved in "investigative" or "prosecuting" functions in a case
must be segregated from the decisionmaking officials in that case. Id. § 554. The third
type of procedure established by the federal act is formal rulemaking. Formal rulemaking
resembles adjudication in most respects except that it is not controlled by the separation-
of-functions provisions. Id. §§ 556-557. See Gifford, supra note 18, at 849 n.333. See also
Note, Ratemaking by Informal Rulemaking Under the Natural Gas Act, 74 COLUm. L. REv.
752, 753 n.16 (1974); Note, The Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements for
Agency Rulemaking, 87 HASv. L. Riv. 782, 788-89 (1974).
Proceedings are assigned to informal rulemaking, formal rulemaking, or adjudica-
tion procedures in part by the Act's definitions which essentially divide administrative
proceedings into two broad categories: rulemaking and adjudication. Adjudication is
defined (through the definition of "order") to include "licensing" but otherwise is de-
fined as the non-rulemaking residual class of agency procedings. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (4)- (7)
(1970). The classification of proceedings, therefore, hinges on the definition of "rule,"
which, in the federal act covers not only pronouncements of "general" applicability, but
matters of "particular" applicability as well. Id. § 551 (4). It also limits the coverage of
its "rule" definition to pronouncements of "future" effect. Id.
The federal act's rule definition embraces three kinds of agency pronouncements.
First, it includes agency pronouncements which would be called rules in ordinary usage,
encompassing "the whole or part of an agency statement . . .designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy ...." Id. Second, it embraces agency "organiza-
tion, procedure or practice" requirements. "Rule means the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability or future effect ...describing the organiza-
tion, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency ...." Id. The third kind of agency
pronouncement, however, is defined by reference to particular kinds of substantive subject
matter to which it relates. Thus, in the third part of the definition, "rule" encompasses
"the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial struc-
tures or reorganization thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances there-
for, or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing."
Id. In short, agency pronouncements on economic regulatory matters are defined as
"rules," and since "rule" is defined to include matters of particular as well as general
applicability, particularized economic regulatory proceedings become classified as "rule-
making." Section 553 of the federal act establishes notice-and-comment procedures for
rulemaking, but carves out an exception for "rules required by statute to be made on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." Id. § 553(c) (1970). For the latter
type of "rules" the procedures of sections 556 and 557 are made to apply rather than
the notice-and-comment procedures of section 553. Thus, as observed above, formal rule-
making is designed largely to conform with the procedural provisions governing "adjudi-
cations," with the principal exception that the separation-of-functions provisions of section
554 are inapplicable to them. See also Gifford, supra note 18, at 849; Jaffe, Basic Issues:
An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1273, 1281 (1955).
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braced ratemaking proceedings involving only one or a few named
parties.2
Several bills embodying this somewhat imprecise definition
of "rule" were introduced in the 1971 legislative session; one was
passed. 23 Besides containing this definitional deficiency these bills
-as did the earlier law Revision Commission proposals and the
bills of the 1970 session-also subjected reparations and initial
licensing proceedings to ex parte consultation provisions which
would have isolated agency members from staff who had played
an adversary or investigative role in the proceedings. These bills,
accordingly, could have been seen as imposing overly judicialized
procedures on reparations and initial licensing proceedings as
well as on future ratemaking proceedings. For reasons probably
relating to the imprecise definition described above and to its treat-
22. A. 3930-A (1970) and S. 7141-A (1970) defined "rule" as:
the whole or part of each agency statement of general applicability or regulation
or code that implements or applies law, or prescribes the procedure or practice
requirements of any agency, including the amendment, suspension or repeal thereof
and the amendment, suspension, repeal, approval or prescription for the future of
rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganization thereof, prices,
facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs or ac-
counting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing ....
If the latter part of the quoted definition, i.e., "and the amendment, suspension, re-
peal, approval or prescription for the future of rates . . . or practices bearing on any of
the foregoing" falls within the scope of the clause introduced by the term "including,"
then the requirements of generality from the initial parts of the definition would govern
the whole definition. If the language "the amendment, suspension, repeal, approval or
prescription for the future of rates . . . or practices bearing on any of the foregoing"
is read as a clause equal to and independent from the clause, "an agency statement of
general applicability or regulation or code," to which it is joined by the conjunction
"and," then the latter part of the quoted definition is not subject to the requirements of
generality governing the initial portion of the definition. This definition is contained in
A. 8261 (1972); S. 7780 (1972); A. 678 (1971); A. 678-A (1971); S. 1558 (1971); S. 1558-A
(1971); A. 3980-A (1970); A. 3930-B (1970); S. 7141-A (1970); S. 7141-B (1970).
23. See A. 678 (1971); A. 673-A (1971); S. 1558 (1971); S. 1558-A (1971). The
legislature passed S. 1558-A, which was subsequently vetoed by Governor Rockefeller.
See Veto Message No. 803, 1971 N.Y. LEGIs. ANNUAL 674. Although the Governor did not
speclfy the exact ground of his objections to S. 1558-A, he said: "in any measure of this
magnitude . . . often major problems are overlooked or improperly dealt with the first
time through. This is particularly true when dealing with an organization as complex
and diverse as State government." He also said: "the Legislature's approval of this
measure has assisted in identifying its problems and bringing them clearly into focus, so
that appropriate steps may be taken to resolve them. I have asked my Counsel to study
this measure, and to prepare legislation for early introduction next Session .... " Since
the Governor's proposals introduced at the next session clarified the "rule" definition and
exempted reparations and initial licensing proceedings from the ex parte communica-
tions provisions, it appears that these matters may have been instrumental in the Gov-
ernor's veto of S. 1558-A. See A. 12275 (1972) and S. 10469 (1972) embodying the
Governor's proposals.
[Vol. 26
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ment of reparations and initial licensing, Governor Rockefeller
vetoed the bill passed in 1971.24 Bills drafted by the Governor's
office dealing with both problems were subsequently introduced
in the 1972 session.25 In these proposals, that part of the rule defini-
tion which referred to ratemaking for the future and other future-
oriented economic regulatory matters was expanded expressly to
include proceedings of particular applicability. The Rockefeller
bills also excepted reparations and initial licensing proceedings
from the ex parte communications provisions. Instead of enacting
the Rockefeller bills, however, the legislature passed a bill2 con-
taining a rule definition similar to the imprecise one of the 1970
and 1971 bills and which also subjected reparations and initial
licensing proceedings to the entire framework of adjudicatory
procedures including limitations upon consultation between
agency and staff. This bill further exacerbated the problems of
enactment by its incorporation of a revised evidence provision;
it thereby lost the endorsement of the Law Revision Commission.2T
As might have been expected, this bill was vetoed by Governor
Rockefeller 28
In the 1973 session, new versions of the Rockefeller bills were
introduced.29 They again embodied precise rule definitions and
exempted reparations and initial licensing proceedings from the
ex parte communication provisions. The 1973 version of the
Rockefeller bills also modified the declaratory judgment provision
from the structure that had been given to it by the Law Revision
Commission and had remained unaltered through the maneuver-
24. See note 23 supra.
25. A. 12275 (1972); S. 10469 (1972).
26. In the 1972 session, bills containing the imprecise "rule" definition and pro-
visions subjecting reparations and initial licensing proceedings to ex parte communica-
tions provisions were introduced in each House-A. 8261 (1972); S. 7730 (1972). The
legislature passed S. 7730 which was vetoed by Governor Rockefeller. Veto Message No.
98, 1972 N.Y. LEcis. ANNUAL 449.
27. "No decision, determination or order shall be made except upon consideration
of the record as a whole or such portion thereof as may be cited by any party to the
proceeding and as supported by and in accordance with a fair preponderance of the
evidence." S. 7730, § 306 (1972). Although this provision was objected to by Governor
Rockefeller, the Law Revision Commission took no position on it. See N.Y. LAw REvi-
SION COMMISSION, REPORT 11 LEcis. Doc. No. 65, 197th Sess. (1974); Veto Message No.
98, 1972 N.Y. LEGIs. ANNUAL 449. See also Woodby v. Immigration Serv., 385 U.S. 276,
281-82 (1966).
28. See notes 26 & 27 supra.
29. A. 7330-A (1973); S. 6273-A (1973).
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ing of the intervening years. Although the Rockefeller bills of
1973 were not reported out of committee, they were the last major
step in the evolution of the structural design of the legislation that
was to be enacted two years hence.3 0 Later in 1973, the Law Revi-
sion Commission undertook a review of the bills that it had sub-
mitted in 1966 and 1969 and of the bills submitted by others from
1970 to 1973, with the stated objective of preparing a new bill to
be submitted to the legislature.3 1
A bill substantially similar to the substitute bills of the 1973
legislative session was passed by both houses during the 1974 legis-
lative session, but was vetoed by Governor Wilson.82 In his veto
message, the Governor indicated that he was generally in accord
with the provisions of the bill, but explained his veto on the
ground that the bill before him "had not focused on a few issues"
which needed to be resolved, although he did not specify those
issues." In the 1975 session, a bill identical to the one vetoed by
30. The major design changes in the State Administrative Procedure Act from
that envisioned by the Law Revision Commission in its formal proposals of 1969 are
thus: (1) the classification of future-oriented ratemaking and other economic regulatory
decisionmaking as "rules" and the removal of the proceedings giving rise to these
decisions from the procedural framework surrounding adjudicatory proceedings; (2) the
exemption of reparations, initial licensing, and other technically complex proceedings
from the ex parte communications provisions of the Act; and (3) the restructuring of
the declaratory judgment provisions.
Since 1970, the Law Revision Commission seems to have favored the imprecise rule
definition originating with A. 3930-A (1970) and S. 7141-A (1970) and the subjection
of reparations and initial licensing to the ex parte communications provisions of the
Act. Thus, the Commission seems to have endorsed A. 3930-A, A. 3930-B, S. 7141-A,
and S. 7141-B in the 1970 session. In the 1971 legislative session, the Commission backed
the vetoed S. 1558-A. In the 1972 session, the Commission apparently did not back the
Rockefeller bills, A. 12275 and S. 10469. Moreover, the Commission gave as its only
reason for failing to endorse S. 8261 (1972) and S. 7730 (1972) an objection to the evi-
dence provisions of those bills. See note 27 supra.
31. See N.Y. LAW REvisiON Co0f1MssION, REPORT 9, 13, L.GIs. Doc. No. 65, 197th Sess.
(1974).
32. A. 9670 (1974). Veto Message No. 185, 1974 N.Y. Ix.Gis. ANNUAL 368.
33. Governor Wilson said: "[r]he bill before me has not focused on a few issues
that I believe need to be resolved (and were resolved by my predecessor's proposal, Senate
Bill 6273-A)." 1974 N.Y. LEGIs. ANNUAL 368. The principal differences between the bill
vetoed by Governor Wilson, A. 9670 (1974), and S. 6273-A, which he apparently approved
of, were the following:
(1) The definition of "agency" in the vetoed bill was broadened to include a state
"office" and "council" and "a public benefit corporation or public authority at least one
of whose members is appointed by the governor."
(2) S. 6273-A excluded from the bill's "rule" definition-and hence from notice-and-
comment procedural requirements and from the bill's publication requirements-"rules
relating to construction or supply contract administration." A. 6273-A § 102 (2) (b) (vi)
(1973).
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Governor Wilson was passed by both houses of the legislature, and
signed into law by Governor Carey.3 4
II. THE BASIC PROCEDURAL DESIGN OF THE NEW YORK ACT
A. Rulemaking Procedures Under the New York Act
In a manner reminiscent of the federal, rather than the model,
acts, 5 the New York Act provides for three types of administrative
34. 1975 N.Y. Laws Ch. 167 (McKinney 1975), as amended by N.Y. STATE AD. PROC.
Acr (McKinney 1976). See also Governor's Memoranda No. 14, 1975 N.Y. LEGIS. ANNUAL
421.
35. The basic design of the federal act is summarized in note 21, supra. In con-
trast to the tripartite design of the federal act, the two versions of the Model Act divided
administrative proceedings primarily into two categories, rulemaking and contested
cases, each of which is provided with its own procedures. See MODEL Acr, supra note
3, § 1 (2), 1 (3); REVISED MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 1 (2), 1 (7). The Acts' definitions
of "rule" determine the matters that are governed by their rulemaking provisions.
"Rule" is defined in the original Model Act to include "every regulation, standard, or
statement of policy or interpretation of general application and future effect .. . adopted
by any agency ... to implement or make specific the law enforced or administered by
it .... " MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 1 (2). The Revised Model Act uses different language
to define "rule" in largely the same way, although the Revised Model Act, by dropping
the reference to statements of "future" effect, brings within the scope of the rule defini-
tion standards designed to be applied retroactively. REVISED MODEL Acr, supra note 3,
§ 1 (7). Both Acts, however, limit their scope to standards of "general" application, and,
to that extent, their "rule" definitions conform to the ordinary and general usage of
that term as a standard governing behavior or by which behavior is evaluated and
which applies in an identical manner to all cases having the same characteristics. They
exclude from the definition of "rule," and hence from the rulemaking procedures,
matters affecting only the "internal management" of the agency and not affecting private
rights or procedures, available to the public. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 1 (2); REVsED
MODEL Acr, supra note 3, § 1 (7) (A). The Revised Act expressly excludes declaratory
rulings from the definitions of "rule" and the original Act does so by implication.
REvISED MODEL Aar, supra note 3, § 1 (7) (B). Both Acts contain provisions designed to
ensure that interested persons are notified of the adoption, amendment or repeal of any
rule and that they be given opportunity to submit, for the agency's prior consideration
in connection with the contemplated rulemaking action, data, views, or arguments.
MODEL Acr, supra note 3, § 2(3); REvIsED MODEL Acr, supra note 3, § 3 (a). The Acts
provide that the submissions may be accepted by the agency either orally or in writing,
but the Revised Act mandates an "oral hearing" if requested by twenty-five persons, a
governmental subdivision, or another agency. REvIsED MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 3 (a)(2).
"Contested case" proceedings under the Model Acts are trial-type proceedings
which would properly be described as "adjudicatory" as that term is commonly used.
In the original Model Act, "contested case" is defined as "a proceeding before an agency
in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or
constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing." MODEL Acr, supra note 3,
§ 1 (3). The Revised Model Act's definition of "contested case" is similar although it
explicitly includes within that definition "ratemaking" and "licensing" proceedings.
REVISED MODEL Acr, supra note 3, § 1 (2). Although both Model Acts contemplate that
1977]
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procedure6 through the use of carefully drafted definitions. In
effect, the New York Act provides for two types of "rulemaking"
procedures and one type of "adjudicatory proceeding." The pri-
mary definition of "rule," promulgated in section 102(2)(a),
consists of two major parts. The first, clause (i),38 contains a des-
cription of an agency pronouncement which corresponds closely,
although not perfectly, with general usage for a substantive rule.
Thus, "rule" is defined to include "the whole or part of each
agency statement, regulation or code of general applicability that
implements or applies law. . . ." This part of the rule definition
differs from those of the federal and model acts insofar as it con-
tains no reference to "interpretation" and no reference to ad-
ministrative "policy. '40 As will be pointed out below,41 these
omissions are not accidental. The clause (i) definition of "rule"
also encompasses agency procedure. 2 The second major part of
the "rule" definition, clause (ii),43 contains a description of pro-
ceedings involving matters of economic regulation and classifies all
such proceedings-including proceedings of "particular applica-
bility"-as "rules." "Rule" is thus defined to include "the amend-
ment, suspension, repeal, approval or prescription for the future
trial-type procedures will be employed in contested cases, the Revised Model Act con-
tains a number of provisions applicable to "contested cases" proceedings which are (1)
designed to increase the degree to which agency decisionmakers are insulated from staff
personnel and (2) intended generally to increase the degree to which a courtroom model
is imposed upon agency adjudicatory proceedings. REvJsED MODEL Acr, supra note 3,
§§ 9 (e)(7), 10(4), 13; see Bloomenthal, supra note 18. These provisions are examined
below in the discussion of adjudicatory proceedings under the New York Act. The Model
Acts provide for judicial review of contested cases, and for pre-enforcement judicial
review of rules, through actions for declaratory judgements. MODEL Acr, supra note 3, §§
6, 12; Ravism MODEL Acr, supra note 3, §§ 7, 15.
36. The New York Act establishes procedures for "adjudicatory proceedings" as
well as procedures for two defined classes of "rule making." See N.Y. STATE An. PRoo.
ACr art. 2, § 202(1), (2), art. 3 (McKinney 1976).
37. N.Y. STATE AD. PRoc. Aar § 102(2) (a) (McKinney 1976).
38. Id. § 102(2) (a) (i).
39. Id.
40. The federal act includes statements of policy and interpretation within its
definition of "rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551 (4) (1970). It requires such statements to be pub.
lished or made available for public inspection and copying. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1) (D),
(2) (B) (1970). It does, however, exempt "interpretative rules" and "general statements
of policy" from notice-and-comment procedures. Id. § 553 (b) (A) (1970).
41. See text accompanying notes 118-32 infra.
42. "'Rule' means (i) the whole or part of each agency statement, regulation or
code of general applicability that ... proscribes the procedure or practice requirements
of any agency ...." N.Y. STATE An. PRoc. Acr § 102 (2) (a) (i) (McKinney 1976).
43. Id. § 102(2) (a) (ii).
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of rates, wages, security authorizations, corporate or financial
structures or reorganization thereof, prices, facilities, appliances,
services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs or account-
ing, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing whether of gen-
eral or particular applicability."'4 Most of that language was taken
substantially verbatim from the latter part of the federal act's
"rule" definition.45
The New York Act, in sectioi 202,46 provides for two types of
"rulemaking" procedures: the first kind, "subdivision one pro-
cedure," governs "the adoption, amendment, suspension or repeal
of any rule as to which a hearing is required by any statute"; 47
the second, "subdivision two procedure," governs "the adoption,
amendment, suspension or repeal of any rule other than those
subject to" the subdivision one procedure.48 It will be observed
that the subdivision two procedure is not limited to rules of "gen-
eral applicability," i.e., rules as commonly understood and as
defined in clause (i) of the New York Act's "rule" definition.49
Subdivision two procedures are essentially notice-and-comment
procedures50 resembling those of section 553 of the federal act,
section 3 of the Revised Model Act, and section 2(3) of the original
Model Act.51 Subdivision one procedures, in addition to notice
requirements, provide for a "public hearing," although the pro-
cedural requirements for the public hearing are left unspecified. 2
44. Id.
45. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970). The reference to "security authorizations" in section
102(2) (a) (ii) is not contained in the federal act. On "security authorizations," see 2 R.
BENJAMIN, supra note 5, at THE DrPAimETrr OF PuBuc SFaWvcE 98-110 (1942).
46. N.Y. STATE AD. PROC. AcT § 202 (McKinney 1976).
47. Id. § 202(l).
48. Id. § 202(2).
49. As originally enacted, the requirements of section 202 (2) were imposed prior to
"the adoption, amendment, suspension or repeal of any rule of general applicability other
than those subject to subdivision one of this section .... ." 1975 N.Y. Laws, ch. 167,
§ 202(2) (emphasis added). Section 202(2) has been amended to remove the italicized
words. 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 935. See N.Y. STATE AD. PROC. Aar § 202(2) (McKinney 1976).
Subdivision two procedures now apply to all "rules." The 1976 amendment, therefore,
would have the effect of imposing notice-and-comment procedures upon those future-
oriented economic regulatory decisions for which a hearing is not required by statute.
50. The agency may, in its discretion, hold a "public hearing" in conjunction with
subdivision two rulemaking. See N.Y. STATE An. PRoc. Aar § 202 (2) (b) (McKinney 1976).
51. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970); RxvisED MODEL Aar, supra note 3, § 3; MODEL ACr, supra
note 3, § 2(3).
52. It has been noted that the enacted State Administrative Procedure Act is a
modification of earlier Law Revision Commission proposals. See text accompanying notes
1-3 supra. The Law Revision Commission proposals, in the manner of the original and
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B. The Law Revision Commission Treatment of the "Public
Hearing" Provision
The Law Revision Commission had previously described its
understanding of the "public hearing" referred to in section 202
as not mandating trial-type procedures. Thus, according to the
Commission:
The proposed bill [§202(3)] makes clear that public hearings held
in connection with rulemaking need not comply with the formali-
ties of trial-type hearings such as are held in connection with
adjudicatory proceedings. In other words, rulemaking hearings may
be of the informal, legislative, and argument type. Hence they need
not employ the formalities of sworn testimony, examination and
cross-examination of witnesses, except to the extent that an agency
may decide that some particular issue is of the sort best resolved
through such formal methods. The Commission's proposed bill
does not affect such existing procedures.5 3
This understanding comports with the usage that Commis-
sioner Benjamin accorded to the term "public hearing" in his
1942 report. 54 It will be observed that an agency conducting a
revised Model Acts, divided administrative action primarily into rulemaking proceed-
ings and adjudicatory proceedings. Following the plan of the Model Acts, they provided
one set of procedures for trial-type proceedings, but in the case of rulemaking, the Com-
mission proposals provided for two types of procedures. In cases where a statute re-
quired a hearing, the Commission bills mandated a "public hearing." In cases where no
statute required a hearing, the Commission bills imposed notice-and-comment procedures.
Because the Commission bills defined "rule" as involving a matter of general applicability
in a manner similar to the definitions of the Model Acts, it was natural to conceive of
the "public hearing" mandated under section 202(1) in those bills as a "legislative" or
non-trial-type hearing. See 1 K. DAvIs, ADMIINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIsE §§ 6.05-6.06 (1958).
See also K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at § 7.06. The Commission, accordingly, expressed the
view that section 202(1) "public hearings" need not be trial-type proceedings. See 1969
N.Y. LAw REVisiON CoMissroN REPORT, supra note 17 at 40; 1966 N.Y. LAW RvISIoN
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 41-42; 1965 N.Y. LAw RiEVISION CoMMIISSION
REPoRT, supra note 15, at 33. Of course, the redefinition of "rule" in the substitute bills
to include proceedings of particular applicability changes the assumptions upon which
the earlier Law Revision comments on the section 202(1) "public hearings" were made,
even though the language of section 202 (1) itself has remained largely unchanged.
53. 1969 N.Y. LAw REvIsIoN COMMIssIoN REPoRT, supra note 17, at 40. Virtually
identical language is contained in the Commission's 1965 and 1966 Reports. 1966 N.Y.
LAw REVISION COMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 41-42; 1965 N.Y. LAw REvISIoN
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 33.
54. Thus, in describing "public hearings" held by the Board of Standards and
Appeals in connection with the adoption of Industrial Code rules under the Labor
Law, Benjamin said:
Public hearings are presided over by the full Board; and sometimes members of
the advisory committee are also present. The procedure at the hearings is in-
formal, and those who speak are not sworn. What is said may include comment
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public hearing pursuant to section 202 retained the freedom, in
the Commission's view, to impose trial methods for the resolu-
tion of those issues for which it deemed the trial method most
appropriate. 51 Under such an interpretation, an agency would be
given a broad mandate to shape its rulemaking procedures to
match the kinds of issues coming before it. Discretion to interpret
or to reinterpret statutory "hearing" requirements in such a way
as to harmonize procedures with issues would place major respon-
sibility on the agencies for designing efficient and fair rulemaking
procedures."6
It appears, however, that the discretion the Commission's
bill would have given to agencies to redesign rulemaking proce-
dures was not as large as a reading of section 202 alone might
indicate. Section 104 of the Commission's 1969 proposed bill
provided (with an exception not relevant here) that the provi-
sions of the proposed bill "shall not be construed to limit or
repeal additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise,
or to change existing agency procedures where such procedures
meet or exceed the standards of administrative procedure pre-
scribed in this chapter.57 Section 104 apparently contemplated that
when existing statutes imposed more judicialized procedures 8
on or criticism of the factual material on which the proposed rules are based,
statements of other relevant factual material that may not have been taken into
account, questions as to the meaning and application of proposed rules, sugges-
tions for changes in the language of proposed rules (affecting either substance or
form), or general approval or disapproval of the rules as a whole. Often there is
discussion between those in attendance and members of the Board or members of
the advisory committee who are present.
Benjamin also noted that a stenographic record of the proceedings was made and that
written comments and suggestions could be submitted within a limited period after the
hearings. 1 R. BENJAMIN, supra note 5, at 306.
55. Thus, the Law Revision Commission stated that an agency might employ in-
formal procedures in a "public hearing" except to the extent that an agency may
decide that some particular issue is of the sort best resolved through . . . formal
methods." 1969 N.Y. LAw REvisION COMMNsSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 40. See text
accompanying note 53 supra.
56. An agency conducting a section 202 (1) "public hearing"-even under the en-
acted bill-has discretion to shape its hearing procedures to the subject matter of its
inquiries. But it will be constrained by the provisions of section 103 (1) to conform to
trial-type procedures which have been read into the hearing requirements of the regu-
latory statute under which the agency is acting.
57. 1969 N.Y. Law REVISION COMMsISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 48.
58. Although the "additional requirements" phrase is ambiguous, draftsmen of ad-
ministrative-procedure legislation often tend to perceive their task as imposing judicial-
ized procedures upon agencies which would otherwise be inclined to act in less judicial
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than would inhere in the section 202 public hearing, the more
judicialized procedures would prevail. Thus, since even the Law
Revision Commission referred to its proposal as providing "mini-
mum safeguards," 59 it is probable that section 104 was intended
to allow case law interpreting even succinct statutory "hearing"
requirements as imposing some aspects of a judicialized decisional
process to prevail over the section 202 procedures.
While New York case law is not rich in detailed guidelines for
agency decisionmaking, there may well be sufficient case law to
preclude an agency, such as the Public Service Commission, from
departing from a basic trial-type format for ratemaking60 Never-
theless, New York case law does not appear to impose the strict
controls upon the decisional processes of agencies engaged in
ratemaking which would have been imposed had the Law Revi-
sion Commission proposals been adopted in unmodified form.0 1
C. The Design of the Law Revision Commission Bills
The rulemaking provisions of section 202-both the notice-
and-comment provisions and the public hearing provisions-were
contained in substantially identical form in the Law Revision
Commission bills of 1965, 1966 and 1969.02 In the Law Revision
ways. Hence "additional requirements" probably was meant to be largely synonymous
with more judicialized procedures.
59. See 1969 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMMISSION RE oRT, supra note 17, at 38.
60. Cf. New York Edison Co. v. Maltbie, 271 N.Y. 103, 2 N.E2d 277 (1936) (per
curiam); Radio Common Carriers v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 79 Misc. 2d 600, 605, 360
N.Y.S.2d 552, 558 (Sup. Ct. 1974), aff'd mem., 48 App. Div. 2d 756, 368 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1975).
Compare, however, Benjamin's description of nontrial-type procedure employed by the
Insurance Department in generalized rate proceedings. 2 R. BENJAMIN, supra note 5,
at THE INSURANcE DEPARTmENT 29-31. Cf. Dakin, Ratemaking as Rulemaking-the New
Approach at the FPC: Ad Hoc Rulemaking in the Ratemaking Process, 1973 DuKE L. J.
41, 70-88; Comment, Ratemaking by Informal Rulemaking Under the Natural Gas Act,
74 COLUM. L. REv. 752 (1974).
61. New York decisions having some implications for the procedural structure of
agency decisional processes include: Wallace v. Murphy, 21 N.Y.2d 433, 235, N.E.2d
759, 288 N.Y.S.2d 613, modified mem., 22 N.Y.2d 879, 239 N.E.2d 922, 293 N.Y.S.2d 339
(1968); Fisher v. Kelly, 17 N.Y.2d 521, 214 N.E.2d 793, 267 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1966) (per
curiam); Sorrentino v. State Liquor Auth., 10 N.Y.2d 143, 176 N.E.2d 563, 218 N.Y.S.2d
635 (1961); Kilgus v. Board of Estimate, 308 N.Y. 620, 127 N.E.2d 705 (1955); Weeks v.
O'Connell, 304 N.Y. 259, 107 N.E.2d 290 (1952); Cruz v. Lavine, 45 App. Div. 2d 720,
356 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1974) (mem.); Weinberg v. Clarkstown, 78 Misc. 2d 464, 357 N.Y.S.
2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Marrano Constr. Co. v. State Comm'n for Human Rights, 45
Misc. 2d 1081, 1087, 259 N.Y.S.2d 4, 10 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
62. 1969 N.Y. LAw REvIsIoN CoMMISSIoN REPORT, supra note 17, at 60-61; 1966 N.Y.
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Commission bills, the public hearing provision was designed to
perform a simpler role than the one to which it now may appear
to be assigned. The Law Revision Commission bills were largely
modeled on the Revised Model Act, an act which, it will be re-
called, divided almost all agency action into two classes: rule-
making and contested cases. 63 The Revised Model Act provided
for notice-and-comment procedures to accompany rulemaking
(with an oral hearing at the agency's discretion); it also provided
that an agency would be required to hold an oral hearing when
one was requested by twenty-five persons, an association of twenty-
five or more members, or another agency or governmental sub-
division." The New York Law Revision Commission followed the
approach of the Revised Model Act in mandating notice-and-
comment procedures but it rejected the mandatory oral hearing
requirements of the Revised Model Act.65 Yet the Commission felt
that in some cases a mandatory legislative-type oral hearing would
be proper. The Commission also noted that some statutes might
themselves require a hearing prior to rulemaking. Accordingly,
the Commission provided for two types of rulemaking procedures
in section 202. One type was notice-and-comment procedure which
LAw VREVISION CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 62-63; 1965 N.Y. LAw RiEvISIoN COm-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 56-58.
63. REVISED MODEL Aar, supra note 3, § 1 (2), (7). See note 35 supra. Declaratory
rulings by agencies do not seem to fit into either category, although for purposes of
judicial review they are given "the same status as agency decisions or orders in contested
cases." REVISED MODEL Aar, supra note 3, § 8.
64. REVISED MODEL ACr, supra note 3, § 3 (a) (2).
65. The Commission explained its position as follows:
An important choice in connection with rulemaking procedures is between re-
quiring a hearing in connection with the adoption of all or of certain categories of
rules . .. and leaving agencies free to employ either written or oral procedures
at their discretion. The Revised Model Act, as well as the administrative procedure
statutes of [certain named states] . .. are among those requiring hearings in some
or all instances. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act, as well as the administrative procedure statutes
of [certain named states] . . . permit agencies to employ written or oral pro-
cedures at their discretion.
The Commission concluded that a third choice was proper. This would re-
affirm judgments previously made by the Legislature. The proposed bill therefore
requires a hearing procedure only where another statute requires a hearing prior
to the adoption of a rule.
1969 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 39. See also 1966 N.Y.
LAw REVISION COMMlssION REPORT, supra note 16, at 41; 1965 N.Y. LAw REVISION Com-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 32.
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was made mandatory by the bill. 6 The second type of procedure
involved a "public hearing," by which the Commission meant a
"legislative" type of oral hearing.67 But the public hearing pro-
cedure would have become operational only in those cases in which
the governing substantive regulatory statute conferring rule-
making power on the agency imposed a hearing requirement. 8
And since a statutory "hearing" requirement in connection with
rulemaking (understood in the ordinary sense of the term) would
generally contemplate a legislative hearing, the Law Revision
Commission bills were in a sense redundant. 9 They provided for
a public hearing only when such a hearing was required by the
relevant independent substantive regulatory statute, and hence no
"public hearing" requirement was imposed that did not otherwise
exist.
D. The Design of the Enacted State Administrative Procedure
Act
The series of substitute bills7 0 that culminated in the present
Act were offered as modifications of the Law Revision Commission
bills to solve the problems raised by the application of the Com-
mission bills to the ratemaking process.7 ' The substitute bills
solved that problem by incorporating in the "rule" definition
much of the language of the federal act's "rule" definition.72 This
more complex definition treated ratemaking as rulemaking and
thus removed it from adjudicatory procedures. 3
66. 1969 N.Y. LAw REVIsIoN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 60-61; 1966 N.Y.
LA'w REVISION CommisSIoN REPORT, supra note 16, at 62; 1965 N.Y. LAW REVISION Com-
MissioN REPORT, supra note 15, at 57.
67. 1969 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 40. See also 1966
N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISsION REPORT, supra note 16, at 41-42; 1965 N.Y. LAW REVISION
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 33. See also note 51 supra.
68. 1969 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 39; 1966 N.Y.
LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 41; 1965 N.Y. LAW REVISION COM-
MIssIoN REPORT, supra note 15, at 32.
69. Indeed, the Commission stated that section 202 (1) of its bills "would reaffirm
judgments previously exercised by the Legislature." 1969 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 17, at 89; 1966 N.Y. LAW REVISION CONMISSION REPORT, supra note 16,
at 41; 1965 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 15, at 32.
70. S. 1236 (1975); A. 2251 (1975); A. 9670 (1974); A. 730-A (1978); S. 6273-A (1973).
71. See text accompanying notes 159-74 infra.
72. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (4) (1970). See text accompanying notes 46-52 supra.
73. N.Y. STATE AD. PRoc. Aar § 102 (2) (a) (ii) (McKinney 1976).
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The result is that ratemaking and possibly other particu-
larized economic regulatory proceedings now fall under section
202. And since ratemaking statutes generally impose a "hearing"
requirement, 4 the public hearing provisions of section 202 now
become applicable to those proceedings. But a difficulty seems to
arise because the legislative history of the Law Revision Commis-
sion bills indicates that the public hearing requirement of section
202 contemplates a legislative hearing,75 while ratemaking-at
least before the Public Service Commission 7-has traditionally
been handled through trial-type procedures.7 7 Actually, this might
be an opportunity rather than a difficulty, because the Law Revi-
sion Commission had construed the public hearing provision as
contemplating legislative-type hearing procedures as a minimum
requirement 8 and as allowing an agency to impose more judicial-
ized procedures whenever the issues could, in the agency's judg-
ment, be better handled through judicialized procedures.70 Under
this approach, the Public Service Commission would be given
significant authority to redesign ratemaking procedures as and
when necessary to produce an optimum combination of efficiency
and fairness.
But the enacted legislation contains a shortened form of the
"construction" provisions contained in section 104 of the 1969
version of the Commission bill. 0 Section 103 of the act provides
that the provisions of that act "shall not be construed to limit or
repeal additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise." '
The result, therefore, may be to limit the power under section 202
74. N.Y. TRANsp. LAW §§ 119, 142(11), 171 (4), 173 (McKinney 1975); N.Y. PUB.
SERV. LAW §§ 72, 97 (McKinney 1955); See also N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAW §§ 66(2), 92(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
75. See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
76. See, e.g., 1 R. BENJAMIN, supra note 5, at 67-68.
77. Id.
78. See the statement of the Law Revision Commission at note 54 supra. The Com-
mission employed the permissive forms "may be" and "need not" to describe the kind
of procedure that was contemplated by the "public hearing" language in section 202 and
to describe procedural devices which that language did not mandate.
79. Thus "public hearings," according to the Commission, "need not employ the
formalities of sworn testimony, examination and cross-examination of witnesses, except
to the extent an agency may decide that some particular issue is of the sort best resolved
through such formal methods." 1969 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
17, at 40 (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 54 supra.
80. See 1969 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMMIssION REPoRT, supra note 17, at 59.
81. N.Y. STATE AD. PRoc. Aar § 103 (3) (McKinney 1976).
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which the Public Service Commission or any other economic regu-
latory agency has to redesign its procedures.8
E. An Analogy Between the Design of the New York Act and
the Florida East Coast Railway Case
In United States v. Florida East Coast Railway,83 the Supreme
Court construed the "hearing" requirement of section 1(14) (a) of
the Interstate Commerce Act.84 That section provides in relevant
part: "The Commission may, after hearing, . . .establish reason-
able rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car service
by common carriers by railroad . . . including the compensation
to be paid... for the use of any locomotive, car, or other vehicle
not owned by the carrier using it. .."85
The controversy in Florida East Coast involved an Interstate
Commerce Commission order establishing so-called incentive per
diem rates chargeable to a railroad for that period in which it had
the use of a freight car owned by another railroad. 0 Although it
had been widely assumed that the "hearing" requirement in
section 1(14)(a) meant an evidentiary or trial-type hearing,87 the
Court held that a notice-and-comment proceeding conforming to
section 553 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act was a
type of "hearing"8 and that this type of hearing would satisfy the
requirements of section 1(14) (a). 0 Implicit in the Court's decision
is the possibility that "hearing" requirements under many other
statutes which had been widely believed to mandate trial-type hear-
ings might be open to similar constructions. 0
Florida East Coast is in many ways a praiseworthy decision.
82. Thus, as the Law Revision Commission itself stated in connection with the
public hearing requirement contained in its own proposed bills, the Act seems to
"reaffirm judgments previously made by the Legislature." 1969 LAw REVISION COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 17, at 39. In a similar vein, section 103 (1) of the Act, which required
imposing a judicial mode of decisionmaking, had previously been construed into statutes
mandating hearings. And the Act does not prevent agencies from imposing judicialization
requirements in addition to those imposed by statute. N.Y. STATE AD. PROc. Acr § 103 (1)
(McKinney 1976); see 1969 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 28.
88. 410 U.S. 224 (1972).
84. 49 U.S.C. § 1 (14) (a) (1970).
85. Id.
86. 837 I.C.C. 217 (1970) Incentive Per Diem Charges-1968.
87. See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1507-10 (1975).
88. 410 U.S. at 226-28, 240-41.
89. Id.
90. Friendly, supra note 87, at 1308-09.
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The administrative action there involved was patently general: it
established a set of per diem rates which were applicable to all
railroads.' Accordingly, the Supreme Court freed the Interstate
Commerce Commission from the need to resort to trial-type pro-
cedures in a context in which they were unduly cumbersome 2
As such, Florida East Coast is one of a number of recent judicial
decisions that have encouraged wider use of rulemaking and of
rulemaking procedures by agencies. 3
For present purposes, the interesting aspect of the decision
is that it altered widely held beliefs about the legal effect of statu-
tory requirements for "hearings." 94 Before then, statutory require-
ments for "hearings" prior to administrative action had been
widely thought to mandate trial-type hearings 5 and, in addition,
to trigger the references in sections 553 and 554 of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act to decisions required by statute to
be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.9 8
In the Florida East Coast context, for example, the order there-
since it involved the regulation of common carriers-was known
to fall within the Federal Administrative Procedure Act's "rule"
definition,917 and, upon the basis of the Interstate Commerce Act's
"hearing" requirement, 98 section 553 was widely thought to im-
pose the formal rulemaking procedure of sections 556 and 557
upon the administrative decisional process.99
As a result of that decision, however, statutory requirements
for "hearings" are less likely to be construed in these manners.
Indeed, it is probably not inaccurate to describe Florida East Coast
as imposing a profound change upon the state of the law. It seems
91. See 410 U.S. at 244-46.
92. Friendly, supra note 87, at 1306-07.
93. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 619-21 (1973);
FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482
F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); WBEN, Inc. v. United States,
396 F.2d 601 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 393 U.S. 914 (1968); California Citizens Band Ass'n
v. United States, 375 F.2d 43, 49-53 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967); American
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966); Air Lines
Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960). Compare NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) with NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
94. Friendly, supra note 87.
95. Id. at 1307.
96. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 (c), 554 (c) (2) (1970).
97. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
98. 49 U.S.C. § 1 (14) (a) (1970).
99. See Long Island R.R. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490, 495-98 (E.D.N.Y.
1970); Friendly, supra note 87, at 1305-06.
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probable that when Congress first enacted the hearing require-
ment of the Interstate Commerce Act, it contemplated an eviden-
tiary hearing.100 And the state of the law at any given time can
plausibly be described as widely-held expectations of the way in
which judges will decide.'0' Florida East Coast, then, changed the
state of the law both from that which was originally contemplated
by Congress and from previously widely held expectations. 02 In
short, the.effective meaning of the hearing requirements08 of many
previously enacted statutes has been drastically changed-perhaps
for the better-by Supreme Court decision.
There is an analogy here to the potential of an act like the
New York State Administrative Procedure Act to reform adminis-
trative law by redefining hearing requirements contained in exist-
ing economic regulatory statutes. To the extent that existing
statutes have been understood to impose judicialized procedures
on decisional processes which could be better performed without
them, an administrative procedure act along the basic lines of the
New York Act could redefine those hearing requirements to man-
date a minimum of non-trial-type shortened procedures, 04 but
with discretion in the supervising agency to employ trial proce-
dures where the agency thinks appropriate105
Admittedly, the extent to which this potential inheres in the
New York Act is unclear. As previously noted,100 section 103 pro-
vides that the Act "shall not be construed to limit or repeal ad-
ditional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise, 0 7 but
when the governing statute merely mandates a "hearing," how
100. See Long Island R.R. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490, 497 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
101. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 458 (1897). See also, J.
GRAY, TIE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 107 (2d ed. 1921).
102. Friendly, supra note 87, at 1307.
103. The effective meaning of these statutory hearing requirements is determined
by the way in which courts would apply them.
104. Reorienting the extent of the Public Service Commission's reliance on trial-type
hearings was recommended in Comment, Utility Rates, Consumers, and the New York
State Public Service Commission, 39 ALBANY L. REv. 707, 767-69 (1975).
105. The Law Revision Commission was willing to vest agencies with power to
impose trial-type hearings where they decided that "some particular issue is of the sort
best resolved through such formal methods." 1969 N.Y. LAW REvISION ColMmIssioN REPORT',
supra note 17, at 40; 1966 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSIOn RErPORT, supra note 16, at 42;
1965 N.Y. LAW REvIsION CO aMsSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 40.
106. See note 56 supra.
107. N.Y. STATE AD. PROc. ACT § 103(1) (McKinney 1976).
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will the New York Act work? The initial reference is, of course,
to the independent regulatory statute which mandates a hearing.
But since the term "hearing" is ambiguous, meaning must be
attributed to that term. Reference, in that case, could be made to
prior case law construing the statutory "hearing" reference or, if
there was no prior case law, to the State Administrative Procedure
Act's casting of the "hearing" requirement into a nontrial mode.
Section 103, however, seems to contemplate that sources external
to the State Administrative Procedure Act 08 will control the con-
tent of a section 202 public hearing, and consequently that the
"hearing" provision of the governing independent statute must
first be construed before reference is made to section 202.109 The
construction of "hearing" in that independent statute then would
govern the meaning attributed to the section 202 "public hear-
ing."110
It will be observed that on this interpretation the "public
hearing" provision in section 202 is meaningless.""' The somewhat
complex structure of the Act which defines ratemaking as rule-
making and which then apparently mandates a "public hearing"
when an independent statute requires a "hearing," neither in-
creases nor detracts from the agency's procedural obligations under
the independent statute."2 The New York Act, then, in these
provisions probably does not convey to ratemaking and other
economic regulatory agencies a mandate to streamline their pro-
cedures. But it may demonstrate a way in which a procedurally
more ambitious state might convey such a mandate to its agencies
through the mechanism of an administrative procedure act.113
108. These sources would seem to include the regulatory statute conferring deci-
sional power on the agency in question, the judicial decisions construing that statute,
and agency-imposed procedural requirements of a judicialized nature. 1969 N.Y. LAw
REVIsION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 38.
109. This approach seems consistent with the original intention of the Law Revi-
sion Commission to "reaffirm judgments previously made by the Legislature." 1969 N.Y.
LAw R VISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 39; 1966 N.Y. LAW REvIsION COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 41; 1965 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMISsION REPORT,
supra note 15, at 32.
110. N.Y. STATE AD. PRoc. AcT § 202 (McKinney 1976).
111. See note 82 supra.
112. Id.
113. It is possible that the Law Revision Commission thought that section 202 (1)
of its bill would permit agencies which had previously conducted trial-type hearings for
rulemaking to replace those hearings with legislative hearings. Thus, the Commission
noted:
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F. Benjamin vindicated
Despite the conclusions of the last section, the New York Act
has accomplished a great deal in the area of economic regulatory
decisionmaking procedures. It has both imposed strict procedural
controls over the noneconomic-and more accusatory-administra-
tive proceedings114 and avoided imposing inflexible procedural
controls upon a class of particularized administrative proceedings,
i.e., the class composed of ratemaking and other future-oriented
economic regulatory proceedings. 15 By so doing, the Act allows
present variations in procedures governing these matters to con-
There is at present considerable variety in the procedures used in connection with
the adoption of rules. They range from no hearings or other formal consultation
procedures whatever, through informal consultation, consultation with formally
established advisory bodies, and hearings of a legislative type, to formal trial-type
hearings.
Thereafter, it asserted:
The proposed bill (§ 202 (3)) makes clear that public hearings held in connection
with rulemaking need not comply with the formalities of trial-type hearings such
as are held in connection with adjudicatory proceedings. In other words, rule-
making hearings may be of the informal, legislative, and argument type. Hence
they need not employ the formalities of sworn testimony, examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, except to the extent that an agency may decide that
some particular issue is of the sort best resolved through such formal methods.
1969 N.Y. LAW RIvSIoN COEMaISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 39, 40. To the extent that
the Commission believed that its proposed bill would have so permitted the replacement
of trial-type hearings with legislative-type hearings, then the Commission must have
believed that the "construction" provisions contained in section 104 of its bill (part of
which are in section 103 of the Act) would not have conflicted with that permission. But
if section 104 of the Commission bill would not have conflicted with the permission
contained in section 202 to convert trial-type hearings into legislative-type hearings,
section 103 of the Act may not (of itself) conflict with an implicit permission contained
in present section 202 (1) to decide particularized "rule making" proceedings without a
trial-type hearing. One response to such an argument would be that section 104 of the
Commission bill was consistent with the provision for legislative-type hearings in section
202, because the previously employed trial-type rulemaking hearings to which the Com-
mission made reference were not required by statute to be in that trial-type form.
Accordingly, whenever an independent statute requires a hearing and when that hearing
requirement is judicially construed to mandate a trial-type hearing, neither the Com-
mission bill nor the present act would change the result.
In another provision, however, the Act does attempt to approve agency efforts to
streamline procedures consistent with fairness to parties. Thus, the Act provides that in
adjudicatory proceedings "an agency may, for the purpose of expediting hearings, and
when the interests of parties will not be substantially prejudiced thereby, adopt proce.
dures for the submission of all or part of the evidence in written form." N.Y. STATE
AD. PROC. Acr § 306 (1) (McKinney 1976) *
114. In such proceedings, the judicial model is widely believed to afford an appro.
priate basis for the design of administrative procedures. See H. R. RE'. No. 1980, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946); S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1945); Gifford, supra
note 18, at 851-52; Jaffe, supra note 21, at 1281.
115. See text accompanying notes 74-82 supra.
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tinue and it avoids freezing existing case law concepts in a statu-
tory codification. 116 Benjamin's reluctance to impose uniform pro-
cedures on the various state agencies thus remains alive. And his
penchant to avoid interfering with an evolutionary development
of procedures over time is followed for ratemaking and other
economic regulatory decisionmaking. 17
III. INTERPRETATIONS AND GENERAL POLICY STATEMENTS
UNDER THE NEW YORK ACT
A. Filing and Publication Requirements
The New York Constitution in article 4, section 8 provides
that:
No rule or regulation made by any state department, board, bureau,
officer, authority or commission, except such as relates to the organi-
zation or internal management of a state department, board,
bureau, authority or commission shall be effective until it is filed
in the office of the department of state. The legislature shall provide
for the speedy publication of such rules and regulations, by appro-
priate laws.1 8
Section 203 of the State Administrative Procedure Act precludes
any rule from taking effect until it is filed with the secretary of
state."19 Section 202 requires the state bulletin-established by the
New York Legislature at the same time that it enacted the State
Administrative Procedure Act120-to carry the text of all rules of
general applicability and the text of all "rules" for which a hear-
ing is required by statute or else to specify the place where the
terms of such rules may be found.1
21
116. See 1 R. BENJAMIN, supra note 5, at 37. "There is weight in the considera-
tion that administrative regulations can, more readily than statutory provisions, be
changed to meet changing conditions or to correct procedures that prove to be unwork-
able." Id.
117. See id, at 25, 35, 37.
118. N.Y. CONsr. art. 4, § 8 (McKinney 1969).
119. N.Y. STATE AD. PROC. Acr § 203 (McKinney 1976). As originally enacted, the
filing requirement of section 203 applied only to rules of general applicability. 1975
N.Y. Laws. ch. 167, § 203 (McKinney 1975).
120. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 160 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977). See 1975 N.Y. LAwS, ch.
167 § 203 (McKinney 1975).
121. N.Y. STATE AD. PROC. Aar § 202 (1) (e), 202 (2) (d) (McKinney 1976). Notice
of proposed rulemaking must also be given, inter alia, through the state bulletin. Id.
§ 202(1)(b), 202(2)(a)(1) (McKinney 1976).
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The Act, however, exempts from the "rule" definition "in-
terpretive statements and statements of general policy which in
themselves have no legal effect but are merely explanatory.' u 22 It
also exempts "rules concerning the internal management of the
agency which do not directly and significantly affect the rights of
or procedures or practices available to the public."'2 8 Thus inter-
pretations and "internal management" matters are freed from the
Act's filing and publication requirements. 24
Prior New York decisions had exempted interpretations and
policy statements from the requirements of Article 4, section 8 of
the constitution. 125 The constitutional filing and publication re-
quirement, the courts have held, is in effect limited to so-called
"legislative" rules. 126 Litigation under the constitutional provision
has also accorded a rather wide scope to the internal management
exception incorporated in that provision. 27 The New York State
Administrative Procedure Act has followed this judicial lead and
has refrained from imposing a filing and publication requirement
upon agency interpretative statements, regardless of the degree
of generality in which they are made. 28 In addition, the Act has
not accompanied its internal management exception with any
language designed to limit the scope of that exception more nar-
rowly than would otherwise be indicated by prior case law. 20
122. N.Y. STATE AD. PROC. Acr § 102 (2) (b) (iv) (McKinney 1976). While the Law
Revision Commission bills defined "rule" as "the whole or part of each agency state-
ment of general applicability or regulation or code that implements, interprets or applies
law or policy," those bills also specifically excluded "interpretive statements and state-
ments of general policy which in themselves have no legal effect but are merely explana-
tory." See 1969 N.Y. LAwi REvISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 57-58, 1966 N.Y.
LAW RE IsION COMMxSSxON REPoRT, supra note 16, at 59-60. Substantially identical lan-
guage is also employed in 1965 N.Y. LAiw REviSION COMMISSION RiEroRT, supra note 15,
at 45-46.
123. N.Y. STATE AD. PROC. AcT § 102(2)(b)(i) (McKinney 1976).
124. Since the publication and filing requirements of section 202 and section 203
are made applicable only to "rules," they are inapplicable to agency actions not falling
within section 102(2)'s definition of "rule."
125. People v. Widelitz, 39 Misc. 2d 51,239 N.Y.S.2d 707 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
126. Id. See also People v. Cull, 10 NY.2d 123, 176 N.E.2d 497, 218 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1961).
127. People v. Fogerty, 18 N.Y.2d 664, 219 N.E.2d 801, 273 N.Y.2d 343 (1966).
128. While it may be impractical to require interpretive statements to be filed and
published, interpretive statements of general applicability may be of an equal practical
importance to many legislative rules to which the filing and publication requirements
apply.
129. N.Y. STATE AD. PRoc. AcT § 102(2)(b)(i) (McKinney 1976).
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B. Exemption from Notice-and-Comment Procedures
These exceptions to the "rule" definition also remove inter-
pretations and general policy statements from the notice-and-
comment rulemaking requirements to which "legislative" rules
are subjected.1 0 The Revised Model Act, unlike the federal act,
literally requires interpretations and policy statements of general
effect to be issued pursuant to rulemaking procedures.' 3 It is
doubtful, however, whether this mandate of the Revised Model
Act is enforceable. When the United States Supreme Court has
attempted to force federal agencies to issue new policies through
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, it has been remark-
ably unsuccessful.132 Perhaps, the New York Legislature has realisti-
cally refrained from requiring the unenforceable.
IV. ADJUDICATORY PROCEEDINGS
A. Definition
An adjudicatory proceeding is defined as a proceeding "in
which a determination of the legal rights, duties or privileges of
named parties.., is required by law to be made only on a record
and after an opportunity for a hearing.' 33 That definition is simi-
lar to the definition of "contested case" in the original and Revised
Model Acts. 3 4 But unlike the two Model Acts, the New York Act
further excludes from the definition of "adjudicatory proceeding"
all "rulemaking" proceedings.3 5 Since the second major part of
the rule definition included proceedings of particular applicability
which concerned specified economic regulatory matters,' 3 it will
be observed that the rulemaking exclusion encompasses many pro-
ceedings which would otherwise be defined as "contested cases"
130. Id. § 202 (2).
131. The Revised Model Act's notice-and-comment procedures in section 3 are
stated as applicable to "any rule," and rule is defined in section 1 (7) to mean "each
agency statement of general applicability that . . . interprets, or prescribes law or
policy...." The federal act provides an exception for these matters. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)
(A) (1970).
132. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
133. N.Y. STATE AD. PROC. ACr § 102(3) (McKinney 1976).
134. MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 1 (3); REVISED MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 1 (2).
135. N.Y. STATE AD. PROC. Acr § 102 (3) (McKinney 1976).
136. Id. § 202 (2) (a) (ii).
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under the Revised Model Act. 3 7 The "adjudicatory proceeding"
definition also excludes "an employee disciplinary action before an
agency" and certain traffic infraction proceedings.18 On the other
hand, licensing decisions that are required by statute to be pre-
ceded by notice and opportunity for hearing are made subject to
the provisions of the Act governing adjudicatory proceedings.""
B. The Approach of the Nezo York Act to Adjudicatory
Proceedings
The Act's most elaborate procedural provisions surround ad-
judicatory proceedings. Since the Act is largely based upon the
Revised Model Act, it will be enlightening to compare the
approach of the New York draftsmen with that of the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws.
The Revised Model Act imposed a heavily judicialized struc-
ture upon agency trial-type proceedings. As part of this judicializ-
ing process, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws sought to
limit extra-record contact between agency and staff members. To
further this objective, staff memoranda or data were explicitly
required to be included in the record of the administrative pro-
ceedings, 14° and agencies that took "official notice" of staff memo-
randa or data were required to afford parties an opportunity to
contest such material.' 4' The Commissioners also inserted a section
governing ex parte communications.142 Section 13 of the Revised
Model Act forbids members or employees of an agency assigned
to decide a contested case from communicating off the record
about an "issue of fact" with any person or party and from com-
municating about an "issue of law" with "any party or his repre-
sentative.' ' 43 An agency member may nevertheless, "communicate
137. Thus, because the prescription of rates for the future is defined as a "rule"
under the New York Act, a proceeding establishing such rates is excluded from the
definition of "adjudicatory proceeding." N.Y. STATE AD. PROc. AcT § 102 (2) (a) (ii), 102 (3)
(McKinney 1976).
138. As originally enacted, the definition excluded "a disciplinary action before
an agency." 1975 N.Y. Laws, ch. 167 § 102 (McKinney 1975). Much of the ambiguity of
the exclusion has been removed by the insertion of the adjective "employee." 1976 N.Y.
Laws ch. 935, § 1.
139. N.Y. STATE AD. PROC. Aar § 401 (1) (McKinney 1976).
140. REVISED MODEL Aar, supra note 3, § 9 (e) (7).
141. Id. § 10 (4).
142. Id. § 13.
143. Id. See Gifford, Report on Administrative Law to the Tennessee Law Revision
Commission, 20 VAND. L. REV. 777, 843-51 (1967).
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with other members of the agency" and "have the aid and advice
of one or more personal assistants."' 144
The New York Act imposes significantly less judicialization
on agency trial proceedings than does the Revised Model Act. The
New York Act omits the Revised Model Act's references to the
inclusion of staff memoranda or data in the record and to the ex-
plicit treatment of staff memoranda or data as matters subject to
official notice procedures. 4 Instead, the New York Act provides,
in its exclusiveness-of-the-record provision, that all "records and
documents in the possession of the agency of which it desires to
avail itself, shall be offered and made a part of the record."'146 It
also expressly requires that parties be given an opportunity, prior
to decision, to contest noticed facts. Cast in language partially
drawn from the original Model Act, these provisions 47 do not go
so far as the Revised Model Act in limiting agency-staff contact.
This same approach is also reflected in section 307(2) of the
New York Act, 48 the counterpart of the Revised Model Act's
section 13 .149 Section 307(2) incorporates the language of section
13, but differs significantly in its exceptions. Like section 13 the
New York Act exempts communications between agency mem-
bers. 1 0 But instead of section 13's limited exemption permitting
agency members to "have the aid and advice of one or more
personal assistants,"'' the New York Act permits agency members
to have the aid and advice of any staff "other than staff which has
been or is engaged in the investigative or prosecuting functions in
connection with the case under consideration or a factually re-
lated case."'152 New York thus imposes a limited ex parte consulta-
tion restriction on agency members, but it is one that prohibits
internal contact by the deciding agency member only with staff
144. REVISED MODEL Acr, supra note 3, § 13(l)-(2).
145. See N.Y. STATE AD. PRoc. Acr § 306(2), (4). Section 306(2) is based upon
original Model Act section 9 (2), but it omits the statement in section 9 (2) that besides the
material contained in the record "no other factual information or evidence shall be con-
sidered in the determination of the case."
146. N.Y. STATE AD. PROC. AcT § 306 (2) (McKinney 1976).
147. See note 145 supra.
148. N.Y. STATE AD. PRoc. AcT § 307 (2) (McKinney 1976).
149. See text accompanying notes 140-44 supra.
150. N.Y. STATE AD. PRoc. Acr § 307 (2) (a) (McKinney 1976); REvisFD MODEL AcT,
supra note 3, § 13(1).
151. REvisED MODEL Acr, supra note 3, § 13 (2).
152. N.Y. STATE AD. PROC. Acr § 307 (2) (b) (McKinney 1976).
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members actively involved on one side of the case in question or a
factually related one.
Finally, section 307(2) does not apply to certain economic
regulatory decisions, i.e., "determining applications for initial
licenses for public utilities or carriers" and "proceedings involv-
ing the validity or application of rates, facilities, or practices of
public utilities or carriers.' 1 53 These latter two exemptions are also
found as exemptions from the federal act's separation-of-functions
and internal ex parte communication provisions.5 4 The objective
of both the federal and the New York acts is to facilitate the is-
suance-of-initial-license decisionmaking by freeing agencies from
restrictive procedures while preserving more judicial safeguards
in license suspension, revocation, and renewal cases where the
issues are apt to be cast in a more "accusatory" framework.' The
exemption for rates, facilities or practices of public utilities or
carriers again is designed to facilitate free agency-staff contact in
cases involving little or no accusatory flavor but which may in-
volve technical issues where the agency will require substantial
staff assistance. 56 Many agency proceedings involving rates, facili-
ties or practices of public utilities or carriers, of course, will be
exempted from adjudicatory procedures because proceedings gov-
erning these matters for the future are defined as "rulemaking."'57
The exemption was needed, however, insofar as it was desired to
exclude proceedings involving the lawfulness of past rates, facili-
ties and practices of public utilities or carriers from the coverage
of the ex parte communications provisions of section 307(2).158
C. The Law Revision Commission Bills: A Comparison
In the Law Revision Commission bills, 159 section 307(2) ex-
cluded neither applications for initial licenses for public utilities
or carriers nor proceedings involving the validity or application
of rates, facilities, or practices of public utilities or carriers. The
153. Id. § 307 (2).
154. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (d) (A), (B) (1970).
155. See text accompanying notes 209-11 infra.
156. Gifford, supra note 18, at 851-52; Jaffe, supra note 21, at 1281.
157. N.Y. STATE AD. PRoc. Aar § 102 (2) (a) (ii) (McKinney 1976).
158. See also Gifford, supra note 143, at 849, 851-52.
159. 1969 N.Y. LAw REvIsIoN COMMIussION REPORT, supra note 17, at 66; 1966 N.Y.
LAw REVISION Co,sanssioN REPORT, supra note 16, at 65; 1965 N.Y. LAw REVISION COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 52.
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Law Revision Commission bills' only modification of section 13
was the broadening of section 13's exemption for personal assist-
ants to include agency staff other than investigative and prosecut-
ing staff.160
In the Law Revision Commission bills, ratemaking was not
defined as rulemaking and therefore probably fell within the
definition of adjudicatory proceeding.' 6 As such it would fall
under the coverage of section 307(2) of the New York Act."2 The
modifications that the Law Revision Commission incorporated in
its version of the Revised Model Act's ex parte consultation pro-
visions are consistent with its general approach to the treatment
of ratemaking and other complex economic regulatory proceed-
ings. The Commission apparently believed that these proceedings
could be subjected to adjudicatory procedures if the adjudicatory
procedures were structured so as not to interfere unduly with
agency-staff contactY.3 Accordingly, it expanded the Revised Model
160. See note 193 supra. The Law Revision Commission's broadening of the "per-
sonal assistants" exemption to include all non-investigative and non-prosecuting staff is
included in the enacted statute. N.Y. STATE AD. PROC. Aar § 307(2) (b) (McKinney 1976).
161. The definition of "adjudicatory proceeding" in the Commission bills seems
broad enough to include ratemaking. In particular, "adjudicatory proceeding" was de-
fined in the Commission's 1969 proposal as "any proceeding before an agency in which a
determination of the legal rights, duties or privileges of named parties thereto is re-
quired by law to be made only on a record and after an opportunity for hearing." 1969
N.Y. LAW REVISION CONIIISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 58.
162. In the Law Revision Commission bills, section 807 (2) applied to all "adjudi-
catory proceedings," without exception.
163. Thus the Law Revision Commission believed that the Revised Model Act
unduly inhibited such contact. Accordingly, it modified the provisions of the Revised
Model Act which it considered too restrictive. On the unduly restrictive nature of the
Revised Model Act upon agency-staff contact, see Bloomenthal, supra note 18, at 616-19.
The Commission proposal maintained a prohibition on contact between the agency and
staff which had been involved in investigative or prosecuting functions in the case being
decided or a factually related case. The Law Revision Commission proposal is similar, in
this respect, to Professor Davis' approach and to that of Commissioner Benjamin. See
K. DAvIs, supra note 18, § 1.04-6 at 23; 1 R. BENJAIMIN, supra note 5, at 244-45; note 164
infra. In drafting its proposal in 1965, the Law Revision Commission may have been
influenced by Professor Peck's then-recent expression of the view that contact between
federal agency members and investigative or prosecutory staff members would be prohib-
ited by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Peck, Regulation and Control
of Ex Parte Communications With Administrative Agencies, 76 HARV. L. REv. 233, 258-60
(1962). The Law Revision Commission may have believed that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment would effect a similar prohibition on contact between
state agency members and their investigative and prosecutory staffs and that the prohibi-
tion in the Commission's proposed bill, therefore, merely restated existing law. The
Commission, however, did retain the Revised Model Act's prohibition on contact between
agency employees acting as hearing officers and all staff, including non-adversary staff.
Perhaps the Commission believed that this prohibition was largely innocuous, because
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Act's exemption to the ban on ex parte consultation to authorize
communication between agency members and all but investigative
and prosecuting staff.164 Elsewhere in its bills, it avoided the Re-
vised Model Act's explicit requirement of introducing staff mem-
oranda into the record.165
These modifications of the Revised Model Act, however, appar-
ently did not go far enough to satisfy the Public Service Commis-
sion166 whose view may have been that rate proceedings are falsified
by treating them in the judicial mold,1 7 even in the limited manner
Benjamin had reported that most rate cases were heard by a Commissioner. 2 R. BENJA-
MIN, supra note 5 at DEPARTMENT OF PUBUC SEPVICE 64. Davis has objected to the ex
parte consultation limitations imposed on hearing officers by the Revised Model Act on
the ground that the absorption of relevant information and analyses in the hearing
officer's report will facilitate informed argument on agency review. See K. DAVIs, supra
note 18. See also id. § 11.14 at 430; 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 52, § 11.17 at 109, § 11.14 at
98-99.
164. Compare the following statement by Commissioner Benjamin:
No member of the staff who has taken a partisan position in the proceeding either
as agency counsel or as witness should be permitted to participate in the process
of decision, unless his participation takes the form of a brief, a written summary
of evidence, proposed findings, or some other writing, and unless such writing is
made available to the parties and they are given an opportunity to criticize and
refute. The same disqualification should be applied to those members of the staff
who in some other capacity (e.g., as investigator) have participated directly in the
preparation for or conduct of a hearing. Where participation has been indirect,
the problem is more difficult. In some agencies, for example, the senior law officer
of the agency is present at conferences of the deciding body at which decisions
are made, and may be called on to advise the deciding body on questions of law
involved in a decision; the same senior law officer is head of the legal staff, mem-
bers of which act as agency counsel. It will sometimes happen, therefore, that he
will have been consulted by one of his staff (in the course of preparation for a
hearing or during the course of the hearing) on a question of law on which he is
later consulted by the deciding body. This is a situation which it is desirable to
avoid, where it can practically be avoided ....
I R. BENJAMIN, supra note 5, at DEPARTMENT OF PUBUC SERVICE 24445 (footnote
omitted). See also 2 id. at 189.
165. See text accompanying notes 145-50 supra.
166. The Public Service Commission objected strongly to the less restrictive pre-
liminary proposal which the Commission promulgated in 1963. See Hearing on S.I. No.
3827 and A.!. 5728 Before the N.Y. Senate and Assembly Committees on the Judiciary
123 (May 11, 1965).
167. Benjamin reported, in 1942, that the Public Service Commission often tended
to rely upon its staff for advice and consultation without much regard for isolating
decisionmakers from those staff which had participated in the proceedings:
Staff assistance may . . . be sought orally or by intraoffice memorandum, for
advice on a subject of particularly specialized knowledge (for example, to
explain the mechanics of a cycle-change in an electrical circuit). The person so
consulted may or may not have been connected with the proceedings. . . . It
is ... stated ... that staff experts may be asked to render conclusions privately
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adopted by the Law Revision Commission. Agency-staff contact is
essential to the ratemaking process and ought not to be hampered
by segregating staff members identified as "investigative" or
"prosecuting."'168 Indeed, it is probably just such staff members
who are most knowledgeable on the issues and technical back-
ground and who can, therefore, most aid the Commission. 69 In
short, the quasi-judicial model employed by the Law Revision
Commission to isolate agency decisionmakers from essentially
adversary staff did not, in the Public Service Commission's view,
fit the ratemaking process. The incompatibility of this model
remained whether the ratemaking was for the future or for the
past, as in a reparations proceeding.'70
to a Commissioner on technical matters, such as whether the electric service
supplied by a respondent utility is adequate, or whether accounting entries
reflect properly the transactions questioned, or whether the exclusion of a given
element from the rate base is "confiscation," or whether a witness's testimony
as to valuation is credible, etc. Naturally, the practices of the various Com-
missioners vary as to the extent to which they solicit these opinions. Requests
for advice are said to be limited solely to explanation of matters in the record.
. . . [L]ittle attempt is made to isolate personnel within the Commission's
organization. Examiners and Commissioners feel free to discuss accounting and
engineering problems with members of the staff, induding those who have par-
ticipated in the case.
2 R. BENJAMIN, supra note 5, at DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE 65-66.
Former Chairman Newton Minnow, in describing the ratemaking functioning of
the Federal Communications Commission, has stated:
[r]he Commission maintains a staff of technical experts who, through con-
tinuous daily contact with all aspects of the industry, are available to consult
with and advise the Commission with regard to all of its ratemaking functions.
In formal ratemaking proceedings, it is also the responsibility of this same staff
to participate therein in order to ensure that a full and complete record is made
so that the ingredients essential to the prescription and approval of rates for
the future are fully developed and that the contentions advanced by the parties
are thoroughly examined.
To isolate the Commission from its staff of experts at the decisional level would
tend to sterilize and hamper the ratemaking processes.
Hearings on H.R. 14 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 142-43 (1961). See Peck, supra note 163, at 256-62.
168. See note 167 supra.
169. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 52, at § 11.10; Peck, supra note 163, at 258. Both
Professors Peck and Davis, however, would segregate decisionmaking officials from staff
who had performed adversary roles. See K. DAVIs, supra note 18, at § 13.02; Peck supra
note 163, at 260. See also Davis' discussion of the proper role of the Common Carrier
Bureau in a Federal Communications Commission rate investigation, K. DAVIs, supra note
18, at § 13.00; Commissioner Benjamin's remarks, supra note 198.
170. On reparations, see e.g., 2 R. BENJAMIN, supra note 5, at DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE 30-32.
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The result of the Public Service Commission's objections
to the Law Revision Commission bills was the introduction of
substitute bills in the 1973-1975 sessions-and the eventual pas-
sage of the 1975 bill' 72-which avoided the imposition of any ex
parte consultation restrictions upon initial-license decisionmaking
and upon the ratemaking process, whether the ratemaking affected
future or past rates. One effect of this resistance of the Public Ser-
vice Commission to the Law Revision Commission bills is the
limitation of the Act's judicial model of decisionmaking to the less
technical and more accusatory types of agency proceedings, where
the judicial model is widely accepted as most appropriate.'7 :
Judicialized procedures have been imposed where they will best
achieve fairness to an accused without unduly obstructing agency
processes. Ratemaking and other technically complex agency deci-
sional processes are left to develop largely outside of the confines
of the State Administrative Procedure Act. Benjamin's cautious
approach has thus been followed. The Act has avoided imposing a
judicial model on decisionmaking where it has not previously been
employed, where the public has a large stake in preserving or
fostering a high quality of technically complex decisionmaking,
where the absence of an accusation of wrongdoing against a re-
spondent minimizes the relevance of the courtroom model of a
purely adversary proceeding as a criterion for assessing the fairness
of the decisional process, and where no demonstration has been
made either that preexisting procedures have been widely resented
as unjust by private parties or that further judicialization would
be likely to improve the quality of the substantive decisions.174
V. LICENSING
The New York Act follows the same cautious approach to-
wards licensing decisional processes. Licensing decisions that are
required by statute to be preceded by notice and opportunity for
171. See notes 23-34 supra & accompanying text.
172. State Administrative Procedure Act, 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 167. See S. 1236
(1975).
173. See note 114 supra & accompanying text.
174. See 1965 LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 376-79; State.
ment submitted by the Public Service Commission on October 9, 1964 included in Hear.
ing on Si. No. 3827 and Al. 5728 Before the N.Y. Senate and Assembly Comnilttees on
the Judiciary 123, 125 (May 11, 1965).
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hearing are made subject to adjudicatory procedures by section
401(1). 17" Although initial licensing decisions are exempted from
section 307(2),176 license renewal, revocation and suspension deci-
sions are not. This is because decisions not to renew and decisions
to revoke or suspend licenses are most frequently made on the
ground that the licensee has violated a behavior norm applicable
to licensees, and hence such decisions tend to have an accusatory
flavor.17 7 They are, therefore, thought to be in need of the pro-
cedural protections of that section.
In the early 1950's, the New York Court of Appeals began
to impose judicialized decisional procedures upon such decisions
as the revocation of motor vehicle driver's licenses and taxicab
chauffer's licenses. 78 In these cases, the great values of the licenses
to their holders were influential in persuading the court to aban-
don the traditional approach which treated such licenses as "privi-
leges" to which the holder had no "right," and hence as not en-
titling him to substantial procedural protections. Rather, the courts
treated the licenses in these cases as equivalent to "property" sub-
ject to constitutional protection . 9 Yet in other areas, such as horse-
racing licensing,8 0 the court has sanctioned a regulatory scheme
based upon the issuance and renewals of one-year owner's licenses
where each renewal is subjected to the same tests as the original
i:3suance. In these areas, the court has refused to impose the strict
judicial model of decisionmaking that it has imposed upon driver's
license revocations. Here the court has reintroduced the right-privi-
I ege dichotomy and held, in effect, that judicialized procedures will
be imposed only where matters of constitutional "right" are in-
volved, or where a statutory hearing requirement exists.' 8 '
175. N.Y. STATE AD. PROC. Ac § 401 (1) (McKinney 1976).
176. Section 307(2) exempts only "applications for initial licenses for public
utilities or carriers . . ." N.Y. STATE AD. PROC. Acr § 807 (2) (McKinney 1976). See 5
U.S.C. § 554 (d) (A) (1970). See also Gifford, supra note 18, at 852; Jaffee, supra note 21,
at 1281.
177. Gifford, supra note 148; Jaffe, supra note 21.
178. Hecht v. Monaghan, 807 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954); Wignall v. Fletcher,
303 N.Y. 435, 103 N.E.2d 728 (1952). Cf., Elite Dairy Products, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 271 N.Y.
488, 3 N.E.2d 606 (1936).
179. 307 N.Y. at 467-68, 121 N.E.2d at 423-24; 303 N.Y. at 441, 103 N.E.2d at
730-31. In Hecht the court also relied upon the necessity of the taxicab driver's license
to the continuance of the licensee in his occupation as a ground for holding the license
to be "property." 307 N.Y. at 468, 121 N.E.2d at 424. See Schwartz, Administrative Law,
1952 Survey of N.Y. Law, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 928, 930 (1952).
180. Fink v. Cole, 1 N.Y.2d 48, 133 N.E.2d 691, 150 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1956).
181. Id. at 53, 13 N.E.2d at 693-94, 150 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
1977]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The State Administrative Procedure Act has incorporated the
court's distinction (as well as that of the Revised Model Act8 2)
between licensing decisions that are subjected to a hearing require-
ment by statute and those that are not.'- Decisions that are sub-
jected to a statutory hearing requirement are subjected by the Act
to the procedures governing adjudicatory proceedings, including
(except in the case of initial licensing decisions)'8 4 the provisions
of section 307.185 The Act, then, does not impose a judicial model
upon any licensing decisions that were not previously subjected
to that model by a combination of statutory hearing requirements
and case law. It does, however, articulate specific procedural re-
quirements s in those proceedings requiring a hearing and thus
serves a limited function in clarifying perhaps otherwise ambigu-
ous procedural standards.s 7
Again, therefore, the Act proceeds in the cautious way
recommended by Benjamin. It has codified the better practice
of those licensing agencies that oversee the grant of more-or-less
continuing authorizations to pursue an activity or to practice a
profession where the qualifications are relatively objective ones
and where licenses are revoked or suspended only for serious in-
fractions of pre-existent standards of behavior. 88 But it has at the
same time avoided obstructing the operation of those licensing
schemes that are designed to operate without trial-type hearings.
In this respect, the caution of the New York Act closely resembles
the licensing approaches of the federal act and the Revised Model
Act.8 9 Thus, for example, in the area of horseracing regulation,'"
the legislature has employed a short-term licensing system to
enable a regulatory agency to exert continuing supervisory control
over the identity of persons active within that industry, but has
182. RE vIsED MODEL Aar, supra note 3, § 14 (a).
183. N.Y. STATE AD. PROc. Acr § 401 (1) (McKinney 1976).
184. Id. § 307 (2), 2d para. (a).
185. Id. § 307 (2). It is not clear, however, that the procedures governing adjudi-
catory proceedings apply to licensing proceedings which are required by the Constitu-
tion, but not explicitly by statute, to be made after hearing. Compare Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 US. 35, 50 (1950) with United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S.
224, 234-38 (1973).
186. See id. §§ 301-307.
187. See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 4, at 736-40.
188. See also Jaffe, supra note 21, at 1281.
189. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 (6), (7), 554 (1970); REvisED MODEL Aar, supra note 3, § 14 (a).
190. See text accompanying notes 180-81 supra.
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avoided the imposition of a trial-type hearing requirement inci-
dent to the processing of license renewal applications. Apparently
this mode of regulation has been adopted as a prophylactic against
the infiltration of criminal elements into a sensitive industry.
191
The State Administrative Procedure Act does not attempt to
change the decisional processes of the New York State Racing and
Wagering Board 92 or other agencies that administer licensing con-
trols where hearings have not been statutorily imposed.
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Judicial Review of Rules
Section 205 of the New York Act provides for judicial review
of rules in an article 78 proceeding or in an action for declaratory
judgment.93 Section 205 is a modification of section 7 of the
Revised Model Act' which, in turn, is a revision of section 6 of
the original Model Act. 95 Section 6 provided for judicial declara-
tions of the validity of a rule in a declaratory judgment action.
Standing to obtain such relief was given to any person in any case
in which it appeared that "the rule or its threatened application,
interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair
[his] . .. legal rights or privileges . . . ."19 Section 6 sought to
eliminate a requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies
by enabling the court to render declaratory relief whether or not
the petitioner had first requested the agency concerned to pass upon
the validity of the rule that he was challenging. 97 In promulgating
this provision, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws probably
thought that dispensing with a need for prior recourse to the issuing
agency on a question of rule validity was eliminating a useless for-
mality, since the agency would be expected to decide in favor of its
191. Cf., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADINISTRATIVE ACTION 533 n.112 (1965).
192. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 7907, 7915 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
193. N.Y. STATE AD. PROc. AcT § 205 (McKinney 1976).
194. REvIsED MODEL AcT, supra note 3, § 7. See discussion of that section in
Gifford, Declaratory Judgments Under the Model State Administrative Procedure Act,
13 Hous. L. REv. 825, 841-59 (1976). See also Gifford, supra note 143, at 818-23.
195. MODEL Aar, supra note 3, § 6.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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own creation.198 But by requiring in section 6 that the agency be
made a party to the declaratory judgment proceeding, 91 the court
would obtain the benefit of agency views of how the rule operated
and why it was needed. Finally, section 6 specified that the rule
should be declared invalid if the court found that it "violates con-
stitutional provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of the
agency or was adopted without compliance with statutory rule-
making procedures. 200
Section 7 of the Revised Model Act made two significant changes
in these declaratory judgment provisions. It provided for declaratory
judgments on the "applicability" as well as on the "validity" of
rules,20 1 and it omitted any reference to the grounds upon which a
rule might be declared invalid. The omission was probably made on
the basis that the grounds for judicial declarations of invalidity con-
tained in section 6 no longer quite fit the revised language of section
7, since that language authorized judicial declarations of rule applic-
ability as well as of rule validity.20 2 The combination of the provi-
sions authorizing courts to pass on rule applicability in defined pre-
enforcement situations with the provision excusing the person chal-
lenging the rule's application from making initial recourse to the
agency is subject to criticism on the ground that it may encourage
courts to invade areas of decisionmaking that ought to belong to
administrative bodies. 3 The core tasks of many agencies involve the
business of applying rules to varying sets of facts. 204 Section 7 has the
potential both to remove such matters from the agencies and to
burden the courts with routine administrative tasks.205 It also
contains the potential for transferring to the initial cognizance of
the courts policy questions that the legislature may have originally
committed to the decisional processes of the agencies.20
The New York Act has, in turn, modified the declaratory
judgment provisions of the Revised Model Act by requiring
plaintiffs to make recourse in the first instance to the agency con-
198. Gifford, Declaratory Judgments Under the Model State Administrative Pro.
cedure Acts, 13 Hous. L. REv. 825, 838 (1976).
199. MODEL AC, supra note 3, § 6; REVISED MODEL Aar, supra note 3, § 7.
200. MODEL Acr, supra note 3, § 6 (2).
201. REvis= MODEL Acr, supra note 3, § 7.
202. See also Gifford, supra note 198, at 841 n.88.
203. Id. at 855; Gifford, supra note 143, at 818-23.
204. Gifford, supra note 198, at 842.
205. See, e.g., id. at 845.
206. Id. at 843-44.
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cerned.°7 To that extent, it alleviates some of the problematic
aspects of the Revised Model Act.208 The Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws excepted declaratory judgment plaintiffs from
a requirement of initial resort to the agency probably to expedite
the resolution of the plaintiff's problem. 20 9 The New York Act
addresses this objective by requiring the agency to act on the
plaintiff's request to pass upon the validity or applicability of the
rule within thirty days, or else to be treated as having denied the
plaintiff's request. 1°
The New York Act also recognizes the potential for judicial
intrusion into areas properly belonging to the agencies when it
adverts to the standing question. The Law Revision Commission
had incorporated the standing language of the Model Acts by
authorizing a declaratory judgment action "when it appears that
the rule or its threatened application interferes with or impairs, or
threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights, property or
privileges of the petitioner."211 The Commission bills provided
that the rule should be declared "invalid or inapplicable" if the
court finds "that it violates constitutional provisions or exceeds the
statutory authority of the agency."212 The substitute bills, including
the one enacted, omitted both the language governing standing
and the language containing the criteria for determining invalid-
ity and inapplicability. Instead, the substitute bills provided that
nothing in that section should be construed to grant or deny any
person standing to bring an article 78 proceeding or a declaratory
judgment action, and said nothing about the grounds upon which
the court was to make its decision.
When questions arise about the extent to which pre-
enforcement review of agency rules would involve undue judicial
207. N.Y. STATE AD. PRoc. Aar § 205 (McKinney 1976).
208. See K. DAVIS, supra note 18, § 1.04-6, at 18.
209. The declaratory judgment remedy has long been perceived as speedy and
efficient. See also Borchard, Declaratory Judgments in Administrative Law, 11 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REV. 139, 140 (1933); Gifford, supra note 143, at 822-23.
210. N.Y. STATE AD. PROc. Acr § 205 (McKinney 1976).
211. 1969 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 62; 1966
N.Y. LAw REVISION COeMIssoN REPORT, supra note 16, at 75; 1965 N.Y. LAiw REVISION
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 49.
212. See note 245 infra. Here, the Commission bills followed the original Model
Act section 6 (2). See text accompanying notes 200-02 supra.
213. See N.Y. STATE AD. PRoc. Aar § 205 (McKinney 1976). See also A. 9670 § 205
(1974); A. 7330-A § 205 (1973); S. 6273-A § 205 (1973).
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intrusion into the administrative decision processes, the federal
courts have handled these questions largely under the rubric of
the so-called ripeness doctrine.214 Whether a question of rule
applicability is or is not ripe depends, under this doctrine, largely
upon both a balance of the degree to which administrative policy-
making has been completed and the extent of the burden imposed
upon the plaintiff if judicial review is denied. 15 I have argued
elsewhere that the declaratory judgment section of the Revised
Model Act can be construed as incorporating a similar balancing
test through an analysis of the Revised Model Act's standing pro-
visions.210 It would also be possible to construe the Model Acts'
standing provisions as delineating a class of persons who may bring
suit when the claims they are asserting become ripe.217 Thus on
this view, those provisions would be subject to the satisfaction of
an overriding ripeness requirement. These uncertainties about the
way the Model Acts' standing provisions would operate may ex-
plain their elimination from the substitute bills of the 1978-1975
sessions.218 They were probably excised because of a fear that they
would authorize the courts to accept cases without considering the
interest in keeping governmental administration free from prema-
ture judicial intrusion, an interest protected by requirements of
ripeness.
Although the New York courts also have developed a ripeness
doctrine, 219 it seems less developed than the federal ripeness doc-
trine and is often either stated in terms of the prematurity of suit
or absorbed into the question of justiciability.220 The special con-
cerns manifested in the federal ripeness doctrine probably under-
lie New York's more fully developed doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.2 1 The Law Revision Commission bills
214. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
215. Id. at 149-54.
216. Gifford, supra note 198, at 852-59.
217. See, e.g., Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967) (plaintiff asso-
ciation's suit dismissed on ripeness grounds, despite the association's standing).
218. See text accompanying notes 201-03 supra.
219. See Old Farm Rd., Inc. v. Town of New Castle, 26 N.Y.2d 462, 259 N.E.2d
920, 311 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1970). See also County of Orange v. City of Newburgh, 30 Misc.
2d 898, 222 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Sup. Ct. 1961). But see also Marthann Realty Co. v. Meade,
59 Misc. 2d 274, 298 N.Y.S. 2d 368 (Supt. Ct. 1969), afJ'd ifem., 34 App. Div. 2d 735, 311
N.Y.S.2d 837 (1970), aff'd mem., 28 N.Y.2d 778, 269 N.E.2d 920, 321 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1971).
220. See note 219 supra. See also H. PETER.REUND & J. MCLAUGHLIN, Nnw YoRK
PRACICE CASES AND OTHER MATEIALS 1219 (2d ed. 1968).
221. See YMCA v. Rochester Pure Waters Dist., 37 N.Y2d 371, 334 N.E.2d 586,
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had required declaratory judgment plaintiffs to make an initial
resort to the agency in question as a prerequisite to bringing suit
in court.222 The Commission probably thought that by imposing
such an exhaustion requirement, it would perhaps avoid the em-
barrassment of allowing "unripe" suits.22 The substitute bills
similarly imposed a requirement that relief first be requested from
the agency, but they imputed to the agency a denial of such a
request if it did not act within thirty days.22 In a situation in which
the agency did not respond within the allotted time to a petition-
er's request that a rule be declared inapplicable to him, there
would remain a possibility that, despite the agency's procrastina-
tion, the balance between the harm befalling that petitioner in the
event that a declaration was not made and the agency's interest
in working out its own policy free from judicial interference
would fall heavily in favor of the agency.2 In order to leave room
for courts to apply ripeness criteria and thus to deny relief in
such cases, the substitute bills sought to eliminate the potential
conflict between the ripeness doctrine and State Administrative
Procedure Act's standing provisions. This conflict, of course,
would appear only insofar as the standing provisions could be
read as conferring an immediate right to relief to persons falling
within their coverage.2 6
In the federal system persons with standing may be denied
372 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1975); Wappingers Cent. School Dist. v. New York State P.E.R.B., 77
Misc. 2d 472, 354 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Allstrom v. Lorenz, 198 Misc. 970, 98
N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
222. 1969 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 17, at 62; 1966
N.Y. LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 75; 1965 N.Y. LAw REVIsION
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 58.
223. In its 1969 Report, the Commission stated:
It was decided ... to circumscribe this right of judicial review [of rule validity
or applicability] by first requiring resort to the agency involved, in accordance
with the widely accepted and generally sound requirement of prior exhaustion
of administrative remedies. The Commission believes agencies should be given an
initial opportunity to pass upon their own alleged errors with the object of
correction, when correction is required. This serves to reduce the work load
of the courts, and also allows for more informed judicial review.
1969 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 42. See also 1966 N.Y.
LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 43; 1965 N.Y. LAw REVISION CoM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 34.
224. See note 213 supra.
225. E.g., Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
226. Thus, as previously suggested, it would be possible to construe the declara-
tory-judgment provisions of the Model Acts as authorizing suits when ripeness require-
ments had been satisfied. See text accompanying note 217 supra.
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pre-enforcement review of agency action because their actions are
not ripe.2 New York has developed something similar to a ripe-
ness doctrine which it has employed under the general declaratory
judgment provision.228 There is no reason why those general ripe-
ness requirements could not be made applicable to judgments on
questions of agency-rule applicability, especially now that the ex-
plicit language of the Law Revision Commission version of section
205 granting rights to relief has been removed from that section.22 9
The drafters of the substitute bills not only removed the standing
language of section 205, but they also inserted a provision expressly
negating an intention to affect standing by anything in section
205.230 These modifications suggest that the drafters of the substi-
tute bills thought that conflicts between agency needs to develop
policy free from judicial interference and private persons' needs to
plan behavior in a context of legal certainty-which the federal
courts resolve in the framework of the ripeness doctrine-could be
dealt with in New York as matters of standing. The absence of any
reference in the revised section 205 to ripeness or to the factors that
a court must weigh in resolving a question of ripeness reinforces
this suggestion.
It appears, however, that it would be a mistake to look entirely
to the New York standing law to resolve these conflicting interests.
Even at the time that the substitute bills were being drafted,
standing in New York to challenge agency action was undergoing
a drastic broadening 31 The New York courts have apparently
adopted -32 the standing tests which the United States Supreme
Court announced as applicable to federal court review of agency
action in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
227. See, e.g., Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
228. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 3001 (McKinney 1974). See Old Farm Rd., Inc. v.
Town of New Castle, 26 N.Y.2d 462, 259 N.E.2d 920, 311 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1970); Park Ave.
Clinical Hosp. v. Kramer, 26 App. Div. 2d 613, 271 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1966), afJ'd, 19 N.Y.2d
958, 228 N.E.2d 411, 281 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1967).
229. See text accompanying notes 211-213 supra.
230. See text accompanying note 213 supra.
231. Dairylea Coop. v. Walkley, 38 N.Y.2d 6, 399 N.E.2d 865, 377 N.Y.S.2d 451
(1975); Douglaston Civic Ass'n v. Galvin, 36 N.Y.2d 1, 324 N.E.2d 317, 364 N.Y.S.2d 830
(1974); Columbia Gas of N.Y. Inc. v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 28 N.Y.2d 117, 268
N.E.2d 790, 320 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1971).
232. See Dairylea Coop. v. Walkley, 38 N.Y.2d 6, 339 N.E.2d 865, 377 N.Y.S.2d
451 (1975); Columbia Gas of N.Y., Inc. v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 28 N.Y.2d
117, 258 N.E.2d 790, 320 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1971).
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Camp2 33 and Barlow v. Collins.234 These tests are satisfied when the
plaintiff asserts that the challenged agency action causes him
"injury in fact, economic or otherwise" and when the interest
asserted by the plaintiff "arguably" falls "within the zone of inter-
ests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question."'233 Unless a statute can be construed to for-
bid judicial review, these tests tend to vest a right to judicial
review in a broad class of affected persons. But this broad, and
perhaps relatively unsubtle,23 6 standing test is workable in the
federal system because the relationship between agency policy
development and judicial review is dealt with under the ripeness
doctrine. For the New York standing tests to operate satisfactorily
in the area of pre-enforcement review, they should also be sub-
jected to an overriding test of ripeness.2ar
B. The operative effect of section 205
Section 205 has very little effect on the availability of judicial
review.238 Whereas the Revised Model Act dealt with the question
of pre-enforcement review by authorizing it in defined circum-
stances, 239 the New York Act does not. New York had previously
23. 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970).
234. 397 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1970).
235. 397 U.S. 150, 152-53. See also United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972).
236. The test is unsubtle because it does not obviously contain criteria that bear
upon the timeliness of judicial review or criteria that attempt to balance the needs of
adversely affected persons for legal certainty with the interest of governmental adminis-
tration in being free from judicial interference in routine operations.
287. This is not necessarily to endorse the incorporation of the federal doctrine
of ripeness into the law of New York, see Note, Developments in the Law-Declara-
tory Judgments, 62 HARv. L. REv. 787, 818 (1949), but to sugges. that the needs of gov-
ernmental administration be weighed in determining the appropriate time for judicial
review of agency action. See also, e.g., Alfred Eng'r, Inc. v. Illinois F.E.P.C., 19 Ill. App.
3d 592, 812 N.E.2d 61 (1974); Pest Control Comm'n v. Ace Pest Control, Inc., 214 So. 2d
892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968). The related New York doctrine of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies appears to be quite similar to the analogous federal doctrine. See, e.g.,
Allen v. Kelley, 191 Misc. 762, 77 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sup. Ct. 1948), af'd mem. 273 App. Div.
963, 79 N.Y.S.2d 312, appeal dismissed, 302 N.Y. 601, 96 N.E.2d 896 (1951).
288. Like certain other provisions of the State Administrative Procedure Act, section
205 is largely redundant. See note 248 infra.
239. That is, the Revised Model Act apparently authorized judicial review of
agency rules when they interfered with or impaired or threatened to interfere with or
impair the "legal rights or privileges" of the plaintiff. REvsiE9 MODEL Acr, supra note
8, § 7.
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allowed pre-enforcement review of the validity and applicability
of administrative rules in some circumstances.24 ° Section 205 now
provides that such review will be allowed when it would otherwise
be available under the general law of standing.241 In short, section
205 seems to direct the question of the availability of pre-enforce-
ment review to the general law, 242 thus making section 205 largely
redundant on this issue.243 The operative provisions of section 205,
then, may essentially be confined to establishing a requirement of
initial resort to the agency concerned as a prerequisite to suit, to
giving the agency power to delay a response for thirty days, and
to requiring that the agency be made a party to the declaratory
judgment action.2"
C. A Final Anomaly
Finally, because of the broad definition of "rule" in section
102(2) (a) (ii),245 section 205 literally applies to judicial review of
future-oriented economic regulatory proceedings involving named
parties. This effect seems slightly ironic, because the Law Revision
Commission had carefully avoided including a provision for judi-
cial review of trial-type proceedings. 246 In its 1965 report to the
legislature, the Law Revision Commission stated that the then-
recent revision in the Civil Practice Law and Rules of former
article 78 of the Civil Practice Act made it unwise to adopt
judicial review legislation without (1) consideration of the develop-
ing experience under the new Civil Practice Law and Rules provi-
sions, (2) a study of variously formulated verbal tests for review
of evidence, and (3) a survey of specific review statutes providing
210. See, e.g., Goodwill Advertising Co. v. State Liquor Auth., 40 Misc. 2d 886,
889, 892-93, 244 N.Y.S.2d 322, 325, 328-30 (Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 928,
244 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1963).
241. N.Y. STATE AD. Paoc. AcT § 205 (McKinney 1976).
242. That is, the availability of pre-enforcement review is governed by legal
sources external to the State Administrative Procedure Act.
243. The partial redundancy of section 205 is thus reminiscent of the intended
redundancy of the "public hearing" provisions of section 202 of the Law Revision Com-
mission's proposed bills and the actual irrelevancy of the entire Act to most aspects of
ratemaking. See text accompanying notes 53-69 supra.
244. N.Y. STATE AD. PRoc. Acr § 205 (McKinney 1976).
245. Id. § 102(2)(a)(ii). See text accompanying note 44 supra.
246. As a result, the State Administrative Procedure Act, which is a modification
of the Law Revision Commission proposals, contains no provision governing judicial
review of adjudicatory proceedings analogous to Revised Model Act section 15 or original
Model Act section 12.
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different review criteria from those in the Civil Practice Law
and Rules.24 7 The Law Revision Commission, in its 1969 report,
again declined to include in its proposed bill a provision for
judicial review of trial-type proceedings for the same reasons. 248
By the time the New York Act was enacted the Civil Practice
Law and Rules had been providing experience for almost twelve
years,249 making part of the original justification of the Law Revi-
sion Commission outdated.250
In any event, the combination of the Law Revision Commis-
sion's position against a provision authorizing judicial review of
trial-type proceedings and the modifications of the Law Revision
Commission bills designed to alleviate the problems created by
the potential impact of the Commission's bill on ratemaking deci-
sional processes resulted in an act which contains provisions
applicable to judicial review of trial-type proceedings involving
future-oriented economic regulatory matters, such as ratemaking,
and lacks provisions applicable to judicial review of other trial-
type proceedings. The Act thus provides for judicial review of
those trial-type proceedings whose procedures are not governed
by the Act25 ' and does not provide for judicial review of those
trial-type proceedings whose procedures are governed by the Act.252
Although a plausible justification for such a distinction in the
judicial-review provisions of an administrative procedure act might
be constructed on the theory that administrative proceedings not
247. 1965 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 43. See also
1966 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 56.
248. 1969 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 55-56.
249. The Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) had been enacted in 1962 to
become effective on September 1, 1963. See 1962 N.Y. Laws, ch. 308, art. 78. Article 78
of the CPLR is a reenactment, with modifications, of Article 78 of the N.Y. Civil Prac-
tice Act, which had been enacted in 1937. 1937 N.Y. Laws, ch. 526, art. 78. See generally
8 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN 9= A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRAcrCE 7801.01 (rev. 1976).
250. Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act had been enacted in 1937, and experi-
ence under that article and its 1962 revision had been accumulating for an extended
period.
251. Section 205 provides for judicial review of "rules," and the procedures of
those trial-type proceedings which are defined as "rules" are not governed by the State
Administrative Procedure Act. See text accompanying notes 172-74 supra.
252. The Act governs the procedures of those trial-type proceedings that are de-
fined as "adjudicatory proceedings" but since "adjudicatory proceedings" are not "'rules,"
they do not fall within the judicial review provisions of section 205. See N.Y. STATE
AD. PROC. ACT §§ 102 (3), 205, 301-307 (McKinney 1976). See generally text accompany-
ing notes 133-39 supra.
1977]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
governed by the act ought to be scrutinized on review,25 3 the differ-
ence in the applicability of the review provisions of the New York
Act appears to be largely an accidental product of the revisions
of the Law Revision Commission's proposals in the struggle over
enactment. The anomaly in the review provisions, however,
appears to bear few practical consequences, because section 205,
which authorizes judicial review of economic regulatory matters,
actually has so little effect 254 that its application to some trial-type
proceedings and its nonapplication to others is unlikely to pro-
duce any new differences in the approaches of the courts to judicial
review of completed trial-type proceedings.255
CONCLUSIONS
The final version of the New York Act applies the full adjudi-
catory framework to a substantially narrower class of cases than
would the bills proposed by the Law Revision Commission in their
formal proposals of the late 1960's. This contraction of the cover-
age of the adjudicatory provisions of the New York Act vindicates,
to a significant degree, Commissioner Benjamin's cautions that
administrative proceedings are too diverse to be appropriately
governed by a uniform set of procedures. This diversity is partially
acknowledged in the provision of the Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act for three major types of proceedings. Yet the Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, perhaps in an effort to simplify,
have provided for only two major categories of proceedings. In the
initial version of the Model Act, which was promulgated in 1946,
the Commissioners limited the provisions governing trial-type
253. See In re Larsen, 17 N.J. Super. 564, 577, 86 A.2d 430, 437 (App. Div. 1952)
(Brennan, J., concurring). In that case Mr. Justice Brennan, then a judge of the New
Jersey Superior Court, asserted that a court, in assessing the question of whether an
agency decision was supported by substantial evidence, should take into account the pro-
cedures by which the agency decision was made.
254. Section 205 does not set forth judicial-review standards nor does it confer
standing of itself. The aspects of section 205 which are not redundant are quite limited.
See text accompanying notes 238-44 supra.
255. Although the courts employ several approaches to the review of agency
action, it appears that agency action that is the result of a legally mandated trial-type
procedure is generally reviewed in an Article 78 proceeding is in the nature of certiorari.
See, for example, the extended discussion of certiorari review in Judge Desmond's dissent-
ing opinion in Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 384-95, 73 N.E.2d 705,
709-15 (1947). See 1 R. BENJAMIN, supra note 5, at 326-51, 359-66. See also J. WEINSTEIN,
H. KoRN & A. MILLER, supra note 249, at J 7803.01-15.
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procedures to a bare minimum, an approach that was a necessary
corollary to its application of those procedural provisions to all
trial-type proceedings. But in the 1961 revision, the Commission-
ers inserted into the Model Act's procedures governing trial-type
proceedings a number of more detailed incorporations of a strict
courtroom model. At the same time, the coverage of those provi-
sions governing trial-type proceedings was broadened. The result
was a highly (and perhaps overly) judicialized framework for much
administrative decisionmaking.
The Law Revision Commission recognized the problematic
nature of this aspect of the Revised Model Act and modified their
proposals for a New York Act accordingly. The progress of the
State Administrative Procedure Act through the New York law-
making process indicates that the Law Revision Commission did
not modify the Revised Model Act enough. The lesson to be
learned from the inadequacy of the Law Revision Commission's
modifications of the Revised Model Act, however, is perhaps not
that it did not sufficiently dilute the Revised Model Act's judicial-
ization approach to administrative decisionmaking, but rather that
it failed to differentiate sufficiently among the various types of
administrative behavior. It perhaps should have differentiated
initially among trial-type administrative proceedings in the way
the federal act does. Had it done so, the New York Act might
have been adopted sooner, and it might have contained procedural
provisions suitably adapted to the ratemaking process.
Yet the very struggle over enactment suggests that the insight
of Commissioner Benjamin has in part been vindicated. Adminis-
trative proceedings, even administrative trial-type proceedings,
may not be all of one mold. Perhaps then, the approach finally
taken in New York reflects a significant degree of wisdom. The Act
imposes a strict courtroom model upon proceedings that carry an
accusatory flavor and those that turn on disputes over adjudicative
facts while it avoids imposing such strict procedural limitations
upon more technical, complex, and less accusatory proceedings,
such as ratemaking and initial licensing. Thus, it limits the strict
courtroom model to those administrative proceedings where that
model is widely recognized as appropriate.
Finally, the structure of the New York Act implicitly sug-
gests that the definitional device is potentially available for whole-
sale administrative reform at a level not usually undertaken in
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administrative procedure acts. Some proceedings which have here-
tofore been treated in a trial format, because the legislature had
required a "hearing" in the substantive statute conferring deci-
sional power upon an agency, could be reallocated to more of a
"legislative" type format by this device. Thus, the proceedings
requiring a changed decisional format could be identified and
then accorded appropriate definitional treatment in an adminis-
trative procedure act as a means of routing them to a set of pro-
cedural provisions designed especially for them. This method of
"reform" is a dangerous one, however, because in a general ad-
ministrative procedure act it is likely that inadequate attention
may be paid to the scope and precision of these definitions and
that they may, as a result, be too broadly phrased. Further, the
reallocation of identified types of proceedings to different deci-
sional formats may be made with inadequate study of the conse-
quences.
